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Beyond the cash he stole, [the offender's] crime lies in smashing 
the delicate patterns of an elderly person's life . ... A lifetime of 
thrift, of small, hard-won advances and setbacks painfully overcome 
left [the victim] with a tiny niche in the world. Now she finds her-
self computing on the backs of envelopes the money she has left 
against the years she might live. "I'm using up my savings and I'm 
worried about running out of money," she said. "How many years will 
I have something to take care of me?"t 
[The Lilliputians] look upon fraud as a greater crime than theft, 
and therefore seldom fail to punish it with death,· for they allege that 
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care and vigilance, with a very common understanding, may preserve 
a marts goods from theft, but honesty has no defense against supe-
rior cunning . • . . tt 
THE poor and the elderly are the principal victims of tl:be high-
pressure and often sophisticated sale techniques of criminal con-
sumer fraud in this country.1 The problem is compounded when the 
poor and the elderly live in inner cities where legal assistance is costly 
and inadequate, and the courts, prosecutors, and investigators are 
overburdened. 2 Yet the executive and legislative agencies responsi-
ble for law enforcement continue to assign a low priority to criminal 
consumer fraud. President Ford has reflected this orientation: "For 
efil:eotive management [of law enforcement], we first have to have 
some hard decisions on priorities. As a starter, I would suggest a 
high priority on violent crime and street crime in the inner-city. There 
is where crime does the most damage to our whole urban structure. 
There is where crime hurts the poor who already suffer enough."8 
The cruel irony of this statement is that one of the most significant 
causes of this suffering is criminal consumer fraud. The statement 
implicitly presumes that the economic impact of criminal fraud on 
low-income consumers is negligible because they are not consumers 
of expensive durable goods. But this presumption "overlooks that 
rapidly expanding American institution, the installment plan and the 
special forms it takes in low-income areas."4 The harm resulting 
from the low-income family's lack of shopping sophistication and its 
vulnerability to "easy credit'' does not end merely with higher prices 
and heavy indebtedness. Repossession, creditor harassment, and 
garnishment of wages take their greatest tolls on the poor. Her-
tt J. SWIFT, GULLIVER'S 'TRAVELS 56 (Everyman ed. 1965). Although few gov-
ernments have embraced this fictional solution to the problem of combatting con-
sumer fraud, it has been reported that the U.S.S.R. has come close. See Peifer, Rus-
sia Shoots Its Business Crooks, N.Y. Times, May 2, 1965, § 8 (Magazine), at 32-
33, 111-12. 
1. H. EDELHERTZ, THE NATURE, IMPACT AND PROSECUTION OF WHrrE·COLLAR 
CruME 9 (1970). Robert W. Ogren, Chief of the Fraud Unit of the United States 
Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia, adds that the metropolitan Washing-
ton, D.C., area has been plagued by a number of so-called "itinerant" or "gypsy" con-
sumer-fraud offenders who operate out of motels and direct their schemes almost ex-
clusively toward the elderly. Interview with Robert W. Ogren, Chief of the Fraud 
Division of the United States Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia, in 
Washington, D.C., April 16, 1975 [hereinafter Ogren Interview]. 
2. See Hearings on Paralegal Assistants Before the Subcomm. on Representation 
of Citizen Interests of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., at 
214 (1974). 
3. Remarks, 81st Annual Convention of the International Association of Chiefs 
of Police, Sept. 24, 1974, reported in 10 WEEKLY CoMP. OF PREs. Docs. 1187, 1188 
(1974). 
4. Caplovitz, The Merchant and the Low-Income Consumer, in Wum-CoLLAR 
CruMJNAL 237, 241 (G. Geis ed. 1968). 
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bert Edelhertz notes: "A surprisingly large number of people 
living in ghettos do have something to lose, but unlike the established 
middle classes the asset in jeopardy is very often the only asset which 
stands between its owner and utter destitution."5 
It is not accurate, however, to allege that both the executive and 
the legislative departments of our government have callously disre-
garded this problem. Until recently, criminal consumer fraud has 
been submerged within the concept of "white-collar crime." In order 
to place criminal consumer fraud in its proper perspective within our 
criminal justice system, it is essential that it first be defined and that 
the full range of law enforcement problems connected with it be 
explored. Earlier writers have proposed definitions deriving from the 
status of white-collar crime offenders or the nature of their acts;6 
we conclude that the problem of criminal consumer fraud can 
best be approached through a definition focusing on its victims. This 
definition suggests a different set of solutions, and these may warrant 
new priorities. 
I. DEFINING CRIMINAL CONSUMER FRAUD 
It has been said that an effective law enforcement approach to the 
problem of white-collar crime does not require a precise definition of 
that concept. 7 Whether or not this is so with regard to the general 
problem, we believe that this same proposition cannot be applied to 
the specific phenomenon of criminal consumer fraud. Each year, 
numerous complaints are lodged with consumer protection groups 
and offices throughout the country. Some of the grievances are 
meritorious, some are not. Some may be resolved by a simple phone 
call and others may require some sort of quasi-legal or administrative 
response. Criminal consumer frauds, however, require an appropri-
ate law enforcement procedure; they must be quickly identified and 
segregated by the complaint-receiving outposts. Before this can be 
accomplished, criminal consumer fraud must be defined. 
Eric Steele's recent study of one state consumer-fraud bureau8 
offers an instructive example of how a law enforcement approach to 
criminal consumer fraud breaks down if the personnel at complaint-
intake centers are not provided with a practical means of identifying 
5. H. EDELHERTZ, supra note 1, at 10. 
6. See text at notes 25-29, 34-35 infra. 
1. See Ogren, The Ineffectiveness of the Criminal Sanction in Fraud and Corrup-
tion Cases: Losing the Battle Against White-Collar Crime, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 
951, 959 n.1 (1973). But see H. EDm.HERTZ, supra note 1, at 3-4. 
8. Steele, Fraud, Dispute and the Consumer: Responding to Consumer Com-
plaints, 123 U. PA. L REV. 1107 (1975). 
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whether complaints received are actually civil or criminal in nature. 
The study reveals that, despite the "quasi-criminal law enforcement 
[role] envisioned in its empowering statute," the bureau served pri-
marily as an institution providing "a more informal level of problem 
solving and concrete dispute resolution."9 His description of the 
institution suggests possible explanations for this apparent disparity 
between theory and practice. He notes that the bureau's hearing 
officers initially treat all consumer grievances as essentially two-party 
disputes to be resolved without resort to legal sanctions.10 Appar-
ently, only a combination of chance and timing determines whether 
the litigation arm of the bureau will take action in a particular case.11 
The bureau's bilateral-dispute approach at the complaint-reception 
and hearing stages is ill-suited to allow recognition of the intricate 
patterns of deceptive conduct that must quickly be identified and 
analyzed to permit effective law enforcement. Even though it is 
proper for an enforcement agency to heed the individual complain-
ant's desire for dispute resolution, it cannot afford to ignore the 
broader law enforcement implications of each complaint. Criminal 
consumer fraud cannot be combatted successfully by either simple 
dispute resolution or an ad hoc approach. 
A. A Proposed Definition 
"Fraud," like "privity," is a generic term almost incapable of 
specific definition. The problem of defining thei equally general 
concept "consumer fraud" is compounded by the present-day inclu-
sion of the phrase under the rubric of "white-collar crime."12 Com-
bining a standard definition of fraud with one of white-collar crime 
9. Id. at 1180. Steele concluded from his study and reports from the Illinois At-
torney General's Division of Consumer Fraud and Protection that "(t]he Bureau's 
stance has shifted in the course of a decade ( or perhaps it shifted in the process of 
implementing the statute and setting up the bureau) from 'rid[ding] the State of 
merchants who habitually employ fraud' by law enforcement to 'righting the wrong 
and recovering the individual's money whenever possible' by acting as the legal repre-
sentative of the consumer." Id. at n.99. 
10. Id. at 1149, 1168. 
11. Id. at 1169. By not systematically monitoring the number of complaints 
that are lodged against particular merchants or businesses, the bureau minimizes its 
ability to determine whether an individual complaint concerns oriminally fraudulent 
conduct that should be segregated from civil contract-type disputes. 
For a description of how several state attorney general's offices process and dis-
pose of consumer fraud complaints, see NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GEN-
ERAL, REPORT ON nm OFFICE oF nm ATTORNEY GENERAL 418-21 (Feb. 1971) 
[hereinafter NAAG REPORT]. 
12. Sociologist Edwin H. Sutherland first coined the term "white-collar crime" in 
his presidential address to the American Sociological Society in 1939. See Suther• 
land, White-Collar Criminality, SAM. Soc. REv. 1 (1940), 
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produces what might be considered a general definition of consumer 
fraud: "an intentional perversion of the truth"13 "by a person of 
respectability"14 "to induce another in reliance upon it to part with 
some valuable thing .... "15 But this is hardly a term of art! We 
would instead define "criminal consumer fraud" as an intentional act 
of lying to, cheating, or stealing from a consumer ( or attempting to 
do so), which is punishable as a crime in any jurisdiction. By defining 
criminal consumer fraud in this manner, we hope to distinguish it 
from civil fraud, which lacks the key element of criminal intent, and 
to liberate it from the catch-all concept of white-collar crime, which 
only serves to camouflage it in the field of law enforcement.16 
In order further to hone this definition into a workable tool for 
law enforcement a.gents, it is necessary to consider ( 1) the develop-
ment of the concept of criminal consumer fraud; (2) how it differs 
from white-collar crime; and (3) its impact on our society. There is 
a paucity of empirical data and expositive legal writing purporting to 
deal specifically with these three topics. Almost without exception, 
scholarly analyses of criminal business behavior have been aimed at 
the very broad range of commercial crime and corruption that is 
generally denominated white-collar crime.17 ·From an analytical 
standpoint, many of the identified characteristics of white-collar crime 
can be attributed to the more narrowly defined problem that we have 
termed criminal consumer fraud. We take the view, however, that 
this latter sort of crime is clearly distinguishable from the former; it 
constitutes a unique category in the criminal law and, as such, it 
13. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 788 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). 
14. Sutherland originally defined white-collar crime "approximately" as a "crime 
committed by a person of •respectability and high social status in the course of his 
occupation." E. SurnERLAND, WHITE CoLLAR CRIME 9 (1949). 
15. See_ BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 788 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). 
16. This definition of criminal consumer fraud is not intended to embrace viola-
tions of purely economic regulations such as price control restrictions and antitrust 
laws, i.e. what Professor Sanford Kadish calls ''those which impose restrictions upon 
the conduct of business as part of a considered economic policy." Kadish, Some Ob-
servations on the" Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Economic Regulations, 30 
U. CHI. L. RBv. 423, 424 (1963). In stating ·that criminal sanctions for many eco-
nomic crimes may be inappropriate, Kadish clearly distinguishes fraud offenses from 
those offenses, such as violations of health and safety Tegulations, to which he does 
not apply his thesis. The authors believe that this distinction is important for in-
vestigatory and complaint-processing purposes and that consumer frauds can in no 
way be considered "morally neutral conduct" for which penal sanctions could not be 
justified. 
17. Reliance has been placed principally upon the following sources in order to 
capsuliu the current approaches and attitudes toward white-collar crime: H. EDEL-
HERTZ, supra note 1; PREsmENTS CoMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMINIS-
TRATION OF JumcE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CRIME AND ITS IMPACT-AN AsSESSMENT 
(1967) [hereinafter 1967 TASK FOllCE REPORT]; A Symposium-White-Collar 
Crime, 11 AM. CRIM. L RBv. 817 (1973). 
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deserves specialized attention and a specialized response. 
B. The Historical Development of the Concept 
Consumer fraud has been debated as an issue of public concern 
since Biblical times.18 Only within the past fifteen years, however, 
has American law vigorously begun to embrace the current phenome-
non known as "consumerism." The call for tougher criminal sanc-
tions for white-collar offenders has been attracting attention only 
recently. Concern with consumer fraud, therefore, antedated the 
currently popular concept of white-collar crime. In early society, the 
shopkeeper-marketplace encouraged face-to-face resolution of dis-
putes between consumers and merchants. The development of the 
legal concept of commercial fraud was the outgrowth of the rise of a 
new middle class in fifteenth-century England that had trade interests 
similar to those of the Crown.19 The concept was designed to protect 
the rich and powerful, and the plight of the common consumer was 
rarely recognized. Underlying this trend in the mercantile law was 
the widespread belief in the supremacy of property rights-a belief 
that reached its zenith in nineteeth-century England with the arrival 
of laissez-faire capitalism. 20 The Industrial Revolution broke the 
pattern of bilateral dispute resolution, and the doctrine of caveat 
emptor dictated that merchants unilaterally determined the buyer's 
rights.21 
The English law's one-sided sensitivity to the property rights of 
merchants was passed on to the leaders of the American colonies. The 
American situation remained unchanged until the early twentieth 
century when the "muckrackers," a group of articulate writers who 
observed the problems created by a rapidly expanding economy, 
exposed the misfortune of the "little man" caught in the grip of bjg 
business and the industrial system. 22 But government response was 
slow, and it took two wars, the Depression, and the return of prosper-
ity before government began vigorously to enter into the dynamics of 
consumer protection. The eventual response of both the federal 
government and the states, although by no means uniform, was a 
18. See Micah 1:1-16, 2:1-12. 
19. See Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE L.J. 1133, 1144-
53 (1931). 
20. Id. at 1171-78, 1183. 
21. Id. at 1156-58. Cf. D. RornscHILD & D. CARROLL, CoNSUMER PROTECTION 
REPORTING SERV. § 1.02, at 4 (1973). 
22. Historian Richard Hofstadter has traced the theoretical roots of the American 
consumer movement to Jacksonian democracy, populism, progressivism and the New 
Deal. R. HOFSTADTER, AGE OF REFORM: FRoM BRYAN TO F.D.R. 18 (Vintage ed. 
1955). 
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proliferation of protective legislation aimed at eliminating the uni-
lateral arbitrariness of the doctrine of caveat emptor.23 
C. The Submersion of Criminal Consumer Fraud Under White-
Collar Crime 
In the 1940's, sociologist Edwin Sutherland examined the con-
sumer exploitation exposed by the "muckrakers" of his day and was 
outraged over an American criminal justice system that ignored the 
criminal activities of the white-collar members of society.24 Thus, 
the coincidence of federal and state regulation of business excesses, 
exposes of consumer exploitation, and a double standard of criminal 
justice led to a sociological classification of serious consumer fraud as 
a form of white-collar crime. 
Sutherland was one of the first American scholars to maintain 
that the traditional crime-causation theories of his day, based on 
factors such as psychiatric disabilities, poverty, and broken homes, 
were not necessarily applicable to the problem of white-collar crime. 
He originally defined white-collar crime as a "crime committed by a 
person of respectability and high social status in the course of his oc-
cupation. "25 Gilbert Geis and Herbert Edelhertz have observed that 
Sutherland, from his sociological point of view, had no qualms about 
loose.ly defining "white-collar crime" to encompass a broad range of 
unethical business practices because he never intended that a partic-
ular action or statute be the focal point of the classification. 26 On the 
contrary, Sutherland used the social position of the offender as his 
reference point.27 Sutherland believed that the legal distinction be-
tween civil and criminal cases based on whether the injury involved 
was to the public in general or to an individual in particular was so-
ciologically unsound and merely compounded the problem of attack-
ing white-collar crime. 28 The essence of white-collar crime, he wrote, 
23. See, e.g., D. RonrsCHILD & D. CARROLL, supra note 21, at § 1.01. For exam-
ples of the new trend in the protective roles being played by state law enforcement 
agencies, see Bowley, Law Enforcement's Role in Consumer Protection, 14 SANTA 
CLARA LAW. 555 (1974); Saxbe, The Role of Government in Consumer Protection: 
The Consumer Frauds and Crimes Section of the Office of the Ohio Attorney Gen-
eral, 29 Omo Sr. LJ. 897 (1968); Note, The Role of California's Attorney General 
and District Attorneys in Protecting the Consumer, 4 U. CAL DAVIS L. REv. 35 
(1971); Note; The Role of the Michigan Attorney General in Consumer and Envi-
ronmental Protection, 72 MrcH. L. REv. 1030 (1974). 
24. See Sutherland, supra note 12. 
25. E. Sunmru:.AND, supra note 14, at 9. 
26. Geis & Edelhertz, Criminal Law and Consumer Fraud: A Sociological View, 
11 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 989, 996-97 (1973). 
27. E. SUTHERLAND, supra note 14, at 9. 
28. E. SurnEiu.AND, CRlMINOLOGY 17-18 (1924). 
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ds that it thrives in situations where the powerful and the professional 
have ample opportunity to exploit the weak and the uneducated. 20 
Ironically, Sutherland's focus on the status of the offender has 
reinforced the view that white-collar criminals should not be treated 
as ordinary criminals. There are four reasons for this. First, white-
collar offenders do not conceive of themselves as criminals. Second, 
white-collar offenses, unlike the so-called "natural" or common-law 
crimes such as murder, assault, rape, and so on, appear to violate a 
somewhat arbitrary set of legislative enactments that are addressed to 
the peculiar economic problems of the day. Third, there is no 
organized effort on the part of civic leaders, churches, schools, the 
press, or even governmental agencies to apply social condemnation to 
these violations. Finally, if all persons who violated traffic and 
health ordinances and administrative regulations were prosecuted as 
criminals, the criminals in the population would greatly outnumber 
the law-abiding citizens.30 These observations, however, provide 
little support for any attempt to establish broad distinctions for penal 
purposes between so-called "economic crime" and street crime. If 
white-collar offenders do not currently perceive themselves to be 
common criminals, it is because they have not heretofore been treated 
as such by the law. Furthermore, while the "traditional" offender 
may have a greater appreciation than does the white-collar criminal 
for the "establishment's" condemnation of his conduct, the former 
may more easily rationalize his behavior as a product of societal ill 
treatment. 31 
Nonetheless, the socioeconomic distinction between offenders has 
served to protect the white-collar criminal. And, since there is a lack 
of sufficient empirical data on the socioeconomic status of the crimi-
nal consumer-fraud offender, he has been thrown into this classifica-
tion. This lumping together of the issue of consumer fraud with the 
popular and much-discussed concept of white-collar crime has merely 
submerged the former in our criminal jurisprudence, and has thereby 
made analysis and treatment of criminal consumer frauds more diffi-
cult. 
If there is good reason to doubt the utility for law enforcement 
purposes of Sutherland's socioeconomic definition of white-collar 
29. Sutherland, supra note 12, at 9, quoted in Geis & Edelhertz, supra note 26, 
at 999. 
30. See Burgess, Comment-White.Collar Offenses in the Wholesale Meat Indus-
try in Detroit, 56 AM. J. Soc. 32 (1950). 
31. For one account of how traditional offenders rationalize their criminal be-
havior based on consumer fraud, see T. PARKER & R . .ALLERTON, CoURAGB OF His 
CoNVICTioNs 98-99 (Arrow ed. 1969), cited in Geis & Edelhertz, supra note 26, at 
1004-05 n.73. · 
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crime, 32 there is even better reason to refrain from attempting to find 
a place for criminal consumer-fraud offenses within that concept. 
Sutherland's definition will not help an investigator or prosecutor who 
must categorize consumer-fraud complaints both according to the 
likelihood that the conduct complained of has occurred (or is contin-
uing to occur) and according to the probable extent of victimization. 
Acceptance of the idea that most of the fraud in our marketplaces is 
perpetrated by a definable class of white-collar offenders has permit-
ted our law enforcement and consumer-protection authorities to seg-
regate most fraud complaints from street-crime cases without further 
scrutiny. This approach is comparable to advising a prosecutor faced 
with a recent rash of sophisticated house burglaries to be on the 
lookout for someone who needs money and has his nights free. It 
offers a potential group of offenders, but does not aid in finding the 
guilty party. 
Edelhertz credits Sutherland with exposing for the first time the 
double standard that permits our law enforcement system to punish 
crimes committed by the poor more harshly than those committed by 
the affluent. 33 But Edelhertz is reluctant to employ Sutherland's 
concept of white-collar crime as a legal definition since he believes 
that discriminatory application of penal sanctions would flow from the 
personalization of our conceptions of any type of crime. 34 Instead, 
Edelhertz would employ a definition that concentrates on the nature 
of the crime. 35 
This criticism of Sutherland's focus on the offender is well taken; 
but Edelhertz's concentration solely on the nature of the particular act 
is also not useful in a law enforcement model dealing with criminal 
consumer fraud. His analysis translates into a case-by-case approach 
by law enforcement authorities, who, reflecting the thinking of a large 
segment of the public, in ,practice shrink from criminalizing the 
exploitive conduct of the white-collar members of society. Because 
these authorities thus view law enforcement as an inappropriate re-
sponse to consumer complaints, the bilateral dispute-resolution 
32. For criticism of this definition, see R. CALDWELL, CR!MJNoLOGY 144-46 (2d 
ed. 1965); Tappan, Who is the Criminal?, 12 AM. Soc. R.Bv. 96, 99 (1947). Some 
authorities recognize that Sutherland's socioeconomic definition of white-collar crime 
submerges meaningful distinctions. Herbert Edelhertz, for example, defines white-
collar crime as "an illegal act or series of illegal acts committed by nonphysical 
means and by concealment or guile, to obtain money or property, to avoid the pay-
ment or loss of money or property, or to obtain business or personal advantage." He 
believes Sutherland's definition is too narrow to comprehend many crimes that would 
fall into ,the "white-collar" category. H. EDELHER.TZ, supra note 1, at 3. 
33. H. EDELHERTZ, supra note 1, at 3-4. 
34. "White-collar crime," he states, "is democratic." Id. at 3. 
35. Id. 
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model, appropriate for civil grievances, has been adopted in many 
jurisdictions to handle civil and criminal cases alike. The result has 
been haphazard handling of serious criminal consumer-fraud cases 
from beginning to end. 
In order to facilitate systematic sorting of potential criminal of-
fenders from purely civil disputants, the offense must be defined in a 
way that commands law enforcement authorities to take into proper 
account the impact of such conduct on our society. From the 
vantage point of victimization, it is difficult to make a meaningful 
distinction between the mugger on the street and the white-collar 
merchant who adulterates a drug to cut his costs or the "singles club" 
operator who deceives his customers. Criminal consumer fraud is 
neither nonviolent nor victimless. It presents us with a foe more 
formidable than the street criminal. While the wealth, background, 
and attire of these offenders may be distinguishable, the economic 
loss and personal misery inflicted upon the unwary victims of their 
crimes is equally tragic. It is equally important to deter a white-
collar crime, a consumer fraud, and a street crime when the offense 
has a similar and undesirable impact upon the victim. A white-collar 
criminal's relatively high socioeconomic status should affect the citi-
zenry's perception of him only in that it may make his conduct seem 
particularly outrageous. Therefore, the fact that our criminal system 
in practice recognizes the different economic origins of various types 
of criminals should not obscure the need to focus upon impact and 
victimization in order to design appropriate solutions. Only impact 
analysis can translate the significance of criminal conduct into an 
empirical base from which effective law enforcement may develop. 
As Edelhertz notes, Sutherland's status-oriented definition of 
white-collar crime is not adequate to allow prosecutors to deal with 
every variety of criminal conduct in which criminal-fraud offenders 
engage. 36 But concentration on new act-oriented legal definitions 
quickly bogs down under subjective notions of business morality. 
There is good reason to believe that focusing on the victim is a 
useful tool for categorizing the phenomenon of criminal consumer 
fraud. 
D. The Incidence of Criminal Consumer Fraud 
Just as the complexity of the marketplace has increased since 
1940 when Sutherland first studied white-collar crime, so have the 
problems and impact of criminal consumer fraud. This phenomenon 
36. Edelhertz is rightfully concerned that it would not cover, for example, a 
scheme whereby assets are concealed in a personal bankruptcy. 
March 1976] Criminal Consumer Fraud 671 
is not one susceptible of easy identification or elimination; the public's 
exposure to criminal consumer fraud increases with each new product 
and service that is put on the market. The tradition of the small-
scale, face-to-face American marketplace has given way to an imper-
sonal transactional environment dominated by large conglomerates 
and chain organizations. Yesterday's shopkeeper has been replaced 
by a sophisticated system of third-party credit granting. Our economy 
is no longer geared merely to meet the basic needs of the majority 
of the population; advertising has skillfully employed the mass media 
to create public needs and desires in service to an economy bent on 
expansion. "The juxtaposition of these desires with our credit econ-
omy," Edelhertz writes, "intensifies the incentive and opportunity for 
fraud in the marketing of consumer goods and services."37 
The hard-core consumer-fraud offender knows that he can feed 
upon technologically induced patterns of conspicuous consumption 
by employing advertising techniques that utilize the simplest of decep-
tive devices, all the while operating under the media's air of legiti-
macy. There are strong indications that economic "hard times" and 
high unemployment rates also contribute to an increased rate of crime, 
including fraud offenses. "With tight money, everybody has to keep 
his bubble from bursting," one Justice Department official recently 
stated. ",[P]eople who have always operated in ithe gray, or maTginal 
area (of business activity) usually fall over the line at this time."38 
Recent statistics seem to support this statement: The chief of the 
Postal Inspection Service, reporting a rise in the incidence of mail 
fraud in the last six months of 1974, noted that "one major reason is 
the recession. "39 
Any examination of the impact of criminal consumer fraud is 
subject to several problems that are somewhat unique to this area of 
law enforcement. To begin with, it is particularly difficult to esti-
mate the incidence of criminal fraud because the line dividing it from 
civil fraud requires proof of criminal intent-an element that is 
difficult to establish. There is a dearth of systematic data available 
regarding crimes perpetrated by fraud offenders. There are, for 
37. H. EDELHERTZ, supra note 1, at 6. One authority on consumer debt points 
out that the proliferation of consumer credit in the United States has served to mag-
nify the impact of frauds in the marketplace today as compared with the situation 
thirty years ago. The total amount of consumer installment credit in 1945 was a 
negligible $2.5 billion. By 1973, the total amount of consumer credit outstanding, 
including noninstallment debt, was about $129 billion, a figure that averaged to al-
most $2,000 of debt for each American household. D. CAPLovrrz, CONSUMERS IN 
TROUBLE 1 (1974). 
38. Calame & Morgenthaler, Crime Rate Is Rising as Joblessness Spreads and the 
Economy Recedes, Wall St. J., Feb. 25, 1975, at 1, col. 6 (eastern ed.). 
39. Id. at 31, col. 4. 
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example, no consolidated statistics comparable to the FBI Uniform 
Crime Reports covering traditional crimes. There are sporadic data, 
however, that indicate that the economic loss resulting from consumer 
frauds may be far greater than that produced by the traditional 
common-law theft offenses-robbery, larceny, and burglary.40 Ac-
cording to the 1967 study by the President's Commission on Law 
Enforcement and Administration of Justice, frauds cost the consumer 
an estimated $1,350 million annually, as compared with a cost to the 
public of $200 million for embezzlement, $100 million for tax fraud, 
$27 million for robbery, $251 million for burglary, and $150 
million for auto theft.41 The Commission's report went on to 
state: "A conservative estimate is that nearly $500 million is spent 
annually on worthless or extravagantly misrepresented drugs and 
therapeutic devices. Fraudulent and deceptive practices in the home 
repair and improvement field are said to result in $500 million to $1 
billion in losses annually; and in the automobile repair field alone, 
fraudulent practices have been estimated to cost the public $100 
million annually."42 In 1965, the Post Office Department reported 
that in fraud cases it actually prosecuted the public lost some $92 
million; only about $3.2 million was recovered.43 The Depart-
40. The statistics gathered from complaints made to George Washington Univer-
sity's Consumer H-E-L-P Center in Washington, D.C. (see D. ROTIISCHILD & D. CAR-
ROLL, supra note 21, at § 28.13) provide a startling estimate of the economic impact 
of consumer frauds in the Washington metropolitan area. ' During a seven-month pe-
riod between June and December of 1974, Consumer H-E-L-P •received a total of 104 
fraud complaints, 92 of which estimated the dollar amount involved. The complain-
ants olainted to have been defrauded of over $37,000, an average of over $410 per 
individual complaint as compared to $88 per complaint for contract-type complaints. 
Compare the above statistics with the National Opinion Research Center's na-
tional survey of households, which "asked whether individuals had been cheated by 
anyone misrepresenting what he was selling or charging a higher price than he first 
quoted. The responses indicated a rate of about 120 cases per 100,000 population 
with an average loss of $99, an average recovery of $20 and an average net loss of 
$78. This would give a national total of about $1·8 million a year-a figure that 
is almost certainly understated." 1967 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 17, at 50, 
citing P. ENNIS, CRIMINAL VICTIMlZATION IN TIIE UNITED STATES; A REPORT OF A 
NATIONAL SURVEY 42 n.4 (1967). 
41. 1967 TASK FoRCE REPORT, supra note 17, at 44, 46, 49. The report concedes 
that the $1,350 million figure is, at best, an "unreliable estimate" because of the non-
systematic manner in which most criminal-fraud cases are handled. The Commis-
sion's estimate of the cost of fraud "covers any method of obtaining money or prop-
erty by cheating or false pretenses, except through forgery or counterfeiting." It in-
cludes the intentional passing of bad checks and consumer fraud. Id. at 49. 
42. Id. at 104. See also White Collar Crime: Huge Economic and Moral Drain, 
29 CONG. Q. 1047, 1049 (1971). 
43. U.S. PoST OFFICE DEPT., 1965 ANN. REP. 142. The Department received 
more than 115,000 complaints in 1965 and procured 607 convictions. In its 1970 
Report, the Department reported that it had received over 125,000 complaints from 
which it obtained 910 convictions and halted over 5,500 fraudulent or border1ine-
fraudu1ent promotions. U.S. POST OFFICE DBPT., 1970 ANN, REP. 21, 
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ment estimated that mail frauds are costing American consumers 
over $500 million a year.44 Ralph Nader, pleading for tougher 
penalties for white-collar crimes such as fraud and corruption, told a 
Senate subcommittee that the United States is currently engulfed in a 
white-collar crime wave that costs Americans at least $4 billion over a 
period of 18 months. 45 
While these figures are impressive, the impact of criminal con-
sumer fraud cannot be viewed as a problem affecting merely money 
or property rights. 46 Like the more visible street crime, criminal 
consumer fraud has an impact that is as much personal as it is 
financial: It causes untold individual suffering and eats at the very 
fiber of our economy and business community.47 Such individual 
suffering has been chronicled in David Caplovitz's study of another 
intimately related phenomenon--default debtors. Consumer-fraud 
offenders often take advantage of the low-income consumer through 
credit sales, which both lend an air ofl legality to specious sales 
schemes and enable low-income people to overextend themselves fi-
nancially. Caplovitz analyzed the plight of over 1000 urban debt-
ors not only as consumers, default-debtors, and defendants to law-
suits, but also as individuals whose lives may be permanently and 
radically changed by the one-two punch of fraud and indebtedness.48 
He relates the horrors that may befall defaulting low-income consum-
ers, ranging from costly and time-consuming efforts to salvage bad 
debts, 49 to garnishment, unemployment, 50 loss of health, 51 nervous 
44. Id. 
45. N.Y. Times, July 20, 1974, at 39, col. ·2 (late city ed.). 
46. H. EDELHERTZ, supra note 1, at 9. 
47. See, e.g., Saar, "Crime in the Suites'' Held Epidemic, Washington Post, April 
13, 1975, at Al, col. 1. "White-collar crime," said a senior metropolitan (Washing-
ton, D.C.) police officer, "causes people more anguish and agony than anything else. 
When a man works all his life to build a home and someone through the manipula-
tion of paper literally destroys him, the family disintegrates." Id., at A14, col. 1. 
48. See D. CAPLOVITZ, supra note 37, at 8-10. 
49. Id. at 286-89. 
50. Default on a debt is often followed by an attempt by the creditor to garnish 
the debtor's wages. Caplovitz reported that 8 per cent of the debtors in cities allow-
ing garnishment of wages to satisfy a debt (19 per cent of those who were garnished) 
lost their jobs. Thirty-five per cent of those who were garnished but did not lose their 
jobs reported that their employers had threatened to fire them if they did not settle 
the debt problem. Furthermore, 20 per cent of the employed garnishees lost at least 
one day of work because of the debt-garnishment problem, a figure revealing still an-
other substantial unpublicized cost to the economy. Id. at 238, 276. 
The data obtained in the Caplovitz report also supported the hypothesis that those 
who lose their jobs because of their debt problems clearly have a more difficult time 
in the job market than others not employed, a fact that indicates that credit problems 
contribute to the ''welfare crisis" in America today. Id. at 237-42. 
51. Based on his index of the psychosomatic symptoms reported by the debtors 
interviewed and upon direct questions about the impact of the debt on the consumer's 
health, Caplovitz concluded that debt problems also contribute to poor health. Even 
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depression, 52 and even family disintegration. 63 While Caplovitz by 
no means suggests that these low-income consumers were all victims 
of consumer fraud, the debt problem is a common by-product of 
unconscionable consumer sales schemes. 
Criminal consumer fraud may also result in physical harm to its 
victims. 54 For example, serious injury may result from the sale of 
adulterated products that fail to meet federal or local statutory health 
standards. Violations of occupational safety regulations and building 
code provisions may expose the consumer to unnecessary risk of fire, 
fatally poisonous wall paints, or other serious health hazards. 66 This 
type of fraud on the consumer, while it constitutes only a small 
portion of the total amount of criminal consumer fraud, is currently 
receiving a great deal of publicity and legislative attention. 60 
Criminal consumer fraud, like while-collar crime, endangers the 
moral values of society. Geis and Edelhertz point out that, while 
"[o]ne tenet of classical sociology is that traditional crime binds 
society together" by allowing society to share moral sentiments, 67 
white-collar crime frequently has a corrosive effect. "The trusted 
prove untrustworthy; the advantaged dishonest. It shows the capa-
bility of people with better opportunities for creating a decent life for 
themselves to take property belonging to others. As no other crime, 
it questions our moral fiber." 58 
In 1966, the President's Committee on Consumer Interests found 
that one in thirty of the letters it received from consumers throughout 
the country conveyed "an attitude of frustration, anger, and displea-
sure with the 'system.' "59 One committee member commented: "The 
though 50 per cent of the debtors interviewed did not believe there was a connection 
between their health and their debt problems, 49 per cent felt there was such a link, 
23 per cent of whom claimed health problems sufficiently serious to warrant consult-
ing a physician. Id. at 280-83. 
52. Id. at 280. 
53. Caplovitz claims that his data established a strong interaction between the 
problems of health and marriage that were created by debt trouble. Id. at 283-85. 
54. According to the National Commission on Product Safety, 20 million serious 
injuries associated with consumer products occur each year in the United States. "Of 
these 20 million injuries, approximately 110 thousand result in permanent disability 
and 30 thousand result in death. The cost of these injuries to the nation each year 
is over $5.5 billion." Remarks by R. David Pittle, Commissioner, Consumer Product 
Safety Commission, Consumer Product Safety Workshop, Buffalo, N.Y., Nov. 8, 
1974. Although these figures do not refer exclusively to injuries resulting from crim-
inal consumer frauds, they illustrate the potential magnitude of a problem whose im-
pact cannot ·be accurately computed. 
55. See 1961 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 17, at 104. 
56. See Part ill infra. 
57. Geis & Edelhertz, supra note 26, at 1004. 
58. R. CLARK, CRIME IN AMERICA 38 (1970), quoted in Geis & Edelhertz, supra 
note 26, at 1004. 
59. Id. 
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most striking feature, in our opinion, is not the allegations of criminal 
fraud that occasionally have been made to us by correspondents. 
Rather, it is the sense of unfairness, of disregard of the individual by 
the organized business community, of lack of effective recourse, and 
of a feeling that the marketplace is unethical."60 Lurking behind this 
anti-business attitude is the potentially explosive reaction of the af-
fected consumers. Given the day-to-day frustrations and indignities 
of ghetto life, the victim of criminal consumer fraud in the inner city 
may come to perceive street crime as his only means of economic 
survival, emotional escape, or moral retribution. Mass violence may 
also result from a combination of the impact of consumer frauds with 
the other problems found in ghetto communities. Testimony before 
the McCone Commission, appointed by the Governor of California to 
investigate the 1965 Watts riots, suggested that the violence in that 
area was, in part, a response by the community to a perceived pattern 
of consumer exploitation. 61 These same sentiments were expressed 
in a Detroit Urban League survey of black Detroit residents following 
the 1967 riots in that city. Forty-three per cent of the respondents 
replied that anger toward the local business people had "a great deal" 
to do with the riot, thirty-one per cent more thought it had something 
to do with the violence, and only eighteen per cent felt this factor was 
unrelated to the riot. 62 
It is a mistake to assume that violence is an abreaction to frustra-
tion by fringe members of our society. The impact of business 
immorality on a community may be much less visible than that of 
street crime, but it can be even more dramatic. A case in point is the 
Monarch Construction Company home-improvement fraud scheme, 
perpetrated in the Washington metropolitan area in 1963. Consum-
er-author Jean Carper made a number of enlightening observations 
about its significance to the community.63 She quotes Postal Inspec-
tor Jason Sounder as saying: 
60. Letter from Mrs. Esther Peterson. Special Assistant to the President for Con-
sumer Affairs, to James Vorenberg, Executive Director of the President's Commis-
sion on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, March 25, 1966, reported 
in 1967 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 17, at 104. 
61. See CALIFORNIA GOVERNOR'S CoMMN. ON nm Los ANGELES RIOTS, VIOLENCE 
IN nm CITY-AN END OR A BEGINNING? 62 (196S), cited in 1967 TASK FoRCB RE-
PORT, supra note 17, at 104. 
62. Detroit Free Press, Aug. 20, 1967, at B4, col. S. These sentiments were reit-
erated eighteen days after the Detroit riots by Detroit Mayor Jerome P. Cavanagh: 
''The deep :resentment of those who take advantage of the slum dweller's lack of 
sophistication in handling money, in selling shoddy goods. in over-charging for what 
he gets is a source of discontent." Speech, President's National Advisory Comm. on 
Civil Disorders, Aug.15, 1967. 
63. See J. CARPER, NOT wrrB A GUN (1973). 
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Monarch was a terribly important case to the community • • • 
[f]or this reason: Our major premise was the fact that Monarch and 
all of these 1[fraudulent home-improvement companies] are symptoms 
of a more malignant condition, and ,that is, the rotten condition of the 
financial comm.unity that will permit loans to ·be made at the behest 
of such fraudulent operators as Monarch. Until somehow or other 
we are able to dig into that and expose it, we are only treating 
symptoms.64 
Carper also quotes former prosecutor Seymour Glanzer: "A crime 
like [Monarch's] strikes at the very structure of people's lives; it is 
long-lasting; it takes a toll clay in and day out." Glanzer, says 
Carper, "sees a great difference between a consumer crime and a 
street crime which is over fast, usually involves small amounts of 
money and produces some trauma, although the victim usually recov-
ers. 'It's the difference between having measles and getting over it,' 
he says, 'and having long-term cancer.' "65 
Carper adds that the social costs of such frauds are large: 11The 
courts are jammed for years in slow, cumbersome efforts to make 
some small adjustments for the victims . . . . The great majority of 
the injured will never sue, or, having sued, will never recover their 
money; most will consider it a victory if they can hold on to their 
homes."88 She not~ that a Federal Housing Authority report indi-
cated that Monarch's fraud probably cost consumers over $6 million, 
and asks: "Where did all that money go? Most of it certainly was 
dissipated in company waste---construction materials, salaries, over-
head, advertising, and selling expenses-just to keep the company 
alive. The other moneY; drained froID/ the poor was distributed 
throughout the community. It went into interest, fees and commis-
sions to noteholders, the banks, the finance companies, the title-
settlement companies, real-estate brokers, the collection lawyers."07 
Carper concludes that the irony of the Monarch scenario and 
others like it is that, without the unwitting cooperation of the commu-
nity's noncriminal elements, such massive frauds on the consumer 
could never succeed. 08 Consumer-fraud criminals frequently operate 
freely in the marketplace. The responsible business and legal com-
64. Id. at 181. 
65. Id. at 203. 
66. Id. at 204. 
61. Id. at 204-0S. 
68. Id. The business community is as susceptible to damage from this type of 
"collusion" as is the consumer. For an example of how the "good faith" transactions 
between fraud offenders and our major lending institutions can have a tremendous 
financial impact on lenders that eventually trickles down to the consumer, see Paul, 
You Have a Friend: How Chase Manhattan tll1d Others Dropped Bundle in Puerto 
Rico, Wall St J., Sept. 19, 197S, at 1, col. 6 (east~ ed.). 
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munities are often too willing to accept the machinations of fast-buck 
operators without first questioning their propriety. Banks and fi. 
nance companies too frequently close their eyes to specious transac-
tions, which depend upon the negotiability of commercial paper, in 
the interest of promoting business. Lawyers have, until recently, 
failed to respond to the legal challenge posed by crimin~ consumer 
fraud and, in some cases, have contributed to the problem by unethi-
cal practices. 69 
II. IMPEDIMENTS TO LAW ENFORCEMENT 
A. Confused Priorities 
The absorption of consumer fraud into the category of white-
collar crime has created a problem much greater than that of lack of 
precision. It has enabled petty hoodlums and fly-by-night operators 
to operate under the guise of respectable and established members of 
the community. 70 The American public and its representatives have 
long been loathe to support any legislation that would threaten mem-
bers of the business community and other professionals with a prison 
sentence. The incarceration of such individuals, it is assumed, would 
offend our perceptions about the societal values of hard work, effi-
ciency, profits, and success. Professor Sanford Kadish, for example, 
has observed that it may be inappropriate to apply criminal sanctions 
to certain business offenders who violate regulatory laws, particularly 
where the line between shrewd practice and outright deception cannot 
always be clearly drawn. 71 
While there may be some merit in Kadish's observation if it is 
directed toward the broad range of marketplace conduct that seems to 
have fallen into the category of white-collar crime, his argument is 
inappropriate to criminal consumer fraud. There is good reason to 
believe that most of the criminal consumer fraud in this country is a 
product of fly-by-night operations and shaky businesses rather than of 
69. See M. F'ruEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETIUcs· IN AN Al>VERSIAL SYSTEM 113-14 
(1975). 
70. The persistence of our lawmakers in legislating distinctions between punish-
ment of white-collar crimes and pumshm.ent of crimes committed by other types of 
offenders can only incite the public's contempt for our criminal justice system. 
Whitney Seymour, Jr., former United States Attorney for the Southern District of 
New York, maintains that this disparity in the treatment of criminals, as was evident 
from a 1972 sentencing study of the Southern District of New York, has generated 
"a practical threat to society in the form of unrest and bitterness." Seymour, Social 
and Ethical Considerations in Assessing White-Collar Crime, 11 AM. CRIM. L R.Ev. 
821 (1972). , , 
71. Kadish, Some Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing 
Economic Regulations, 30 U. Cm. L. R.Ev. 423, 446 (1963 ). 
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large well-established corporations. Despite their often impersonal 
treatment of customers and oligopolistic positions in the marketplace, 
the largest corporations in America today realize that they cannot 
prosper in the long run by defrauding the consumer. The hard-core 
consumer-fraud offender, on the other hand, is usually interested in 
short-term profit from schemes that are often hastily devised to take 
in the uneducated and the unwary. He may be an itinerant offender 
who thinks in terms of exploiting an area or a segment of the popula-
tion and then moving on to virgin territory, or he may be the owner 
of a shaky business who hopes that his scheme will keep it from go-
ing into the red.72 
In our opinion, focusing on the background of white-coUar of-
fenders has impeded the entire gambit of law enforcement, from 
investigation to law reform, because it has permitted racketeers to 
profit from society's reluctance and inability to deal with the white-
collar criminal. It has diverted our law enforcement priorities away 
from criminal consumer fraud toward street crime even though an 
effective attack on criminal consumer fraud may provide a far greater 
marginal return to the American public than can any "war" on street 
crime. Law enforcement priorities should be sensitive to impact 
analysis, yet criminal consumer fraud has been assigned a low priority 
that is manifested by a lack of operating and research funds and a 
lack of personnel available for the difficult investigations necessitated 
by this type of crime. 
B. Investigation 
The task of detecting and investigating criminal consumer fraud 
is made difficult because these schemes are often camouflaged in the 
trappings of day-to-day commercial transactions and therefore may 
not be easily distinguishable from noncriminal business activities. 73 
The camouflage is more deceptive because of the "mix" of consumer 
fraud complaints. They generally break down into three categories: 
(1) complaints requesting information (usually in search of adversar-
ial answers); (2) complaints alleging a "civil" dispute (contract-type 
complaints); and (3) complaints alleging a consumer fraud that has 
the elements of a crime. 74 The last category, consumer fraud, com-
72. The empirical data gathered by Consumer H-E-L-P reveal the large economic 
impact caused by criminal consumer-fraud offenders. See notes 40 supra & 14 infra. 
73. Prosecutor Robert Ogren has reported that only about a dozen consumer-
fraud cases were prosecuted in ·the District of Columbia during the three-year period 
from 1970 to 1972, a figure which, he suggests, is unrepresentative of the magnitude 
of the existing fraud problem in that jurisdiction. Ogren, supra note 7, at 973. 
74. A breakdown of complaints received indicates that 8 per cent are inquiries 
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prises the smallest percentage of complaints. The enormous number 
of complaints inundates the investigative capacity of most agencies, 
and the third category is obscured by the other two if it is not sorted 
out.75 
Steele's recent study of one bureau of the Illinois Attorney Gener-
al's Division of Consumer Fraud and Protection illustrates the inevit-
able result of attempting to deal with this "mix" without an adequate 
sort. 76 The problems he describes probably are not uncommon 
among those of our nation's law enforcement agencies charged with 
consumer protection. 
Where financial-fraud and mail-order schemes are alleged, the 
crime may be so technical that its detection is possible only after a 
detailed and lengthy audit or economic analysis by specially trained 
law enforcement personnel.77 In contrast with street crimes, which 
normally have a visible and immediate impact upon their victims even 
where the offender escapes detection, criminal consumer fraud 
presents society with an offender whose crime may, if at all, be 
uncovered only after delay. Many consumer-fraud schemes are cal-
culated to exploit delays in their victims' awareness of the deceit 
involved, thereby frustrating detection and investigation efforts. 78 
Even where these types of frauds are detected, the investigation 
that request no action, 84.5 per cent are nonfraud complaints, and 7.5 per cent are 
complaints that are classified as possible criminal fraud. These statistics were de-
,rived from a sample file of 1,312 complaints compiled for the United States Attor-
ney's Consumer ;Fraud Project. Our estimates, based on 35,000 complaints received 
since 1970, lead to our projection that the range of fraud complaints is between 8 
per cent and 15 per cent. 
75. Consumer H-E-L-P's estimate is that, of the 25,000 anticipated yearly com-
plaints of types (b) and (c), a maximum of 3,750 will fall into the fraud category. 
16. See Steele, supra note 8; text at notes 8-11 supra. Steele's study analyzed 59 
per cent of the consumer complaints received by the bureau and concluded that con-
fusion existed over the role of the bureau as well as over the proper handling of seri-
ous nonresolvable fraud complaints. Id. at 1170-71. The bureau's hearing officers 
apparently attempted, whenever possible, to categorize all complaints received as civil 
disputes. ''They make no investigation of the business or other consumers, nor do 
they check Bureau files or other files about past complaints or investigations . . . . 
This screening is not made from a law enforcement stance, where the criterion for 
decision would be the normative quality of the seller's past conduct." Id. at 1148. 
Steele also observed that one important complaint-screening criterion used by the bu-
reau's hearing officers at the initial stage of investigations was the "standard of dis-
pute solvability." 
If it appears that the action of the Bureau will help the complainant to settle 
the dispute without too much effort, the Bureau will intezyene even if the com-
plaint is not serious and does not involve a high probability of fraud; ·the stand-
ard of solvability leads the Bureau to act on some cases where •the complaint 
is not strong and not to act where strong complaints appear difficult to resolve. 
Id. at 1150. This type of screening standard. is incompatible with the sorting out 
of complaints at initial stages of processing that we feel proper law enforcement re-
quires. 
77. See Wall St. J., Feb. 25, 1975, at 25, col. 2 (eastern ed.). 
78. For examples of such schemes, see H. EDBLHERTZ, supra note 1, at 23-24. 
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problems often are compounded by jurisdictional disputes among 
local, state, and federal agencies with overlapping authority,79 inade-
quate provisions for compensating witnesses for their cooperation, 80 
and interview techniques that generally have been ineffective in the 
inner city where those victimized by fraud commonly distrust law 
enforcement authorities. 81 Whereas speed and timing are normally 
of the essence in the investigation of common forms of street crime, 
the investigation of criminal consumer frauds often requires a more 
thorough and painstaking approach, not only to discover the existence 
of the illegal act itself, but also to establish the requisite element of 
criminal intent and the extent of victimization caused by the fraud. 
The investigation necessary to establish criminal intent is compli-
cated by the burden of proof in criminal consumer-fraud cases. Under 
traditional notions of criminal law and most, if not all, of the criminal 
statutes in this country, any fraud offense that carries a criminal 
sanction requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
intended to do the prohibited act.82 As a practical matter, this 
standard poses difficult problems for the prosecutor in terms of the 
quantity and quality of evidence needed to establish his prima facie 
case. 
The best examples of the burden of proof problem arise in cases 
under the Federal Mail Fraud Act. 83 Like most criminal-fraud and 
deception statutes, this act requires proof of criminal intent as an 
essential element of the offense.84 When an alleged fraud making 
some use of the mails comes to the prosecutor's attention, the most 
difficult task that he faces is gathering sufficient evidence to prove 
that the person or persons involved acted with intent to defraud. This 
19. See id. at 21, 27-28. 
80. See id. at 32-33. 
81. See id. at 35-36. 
82. See 37 C.J.S. Fraud§ 151 (1943). 
83. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1970). This statute is used by prosecutors to reach fraud-
ulent conduct where the mails have been used to further a scheme with the intent 
to defraud. See, e.g., United States v. Shavin, 287 F.2d 647, 648-49 (7th Cir. 1961); 
United States v. Pisciotta, 469 F.2d 329, 330 (10th Cir.' 1972). 
84. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1970). But see N.Y. EXEc. I.Aw§ 63 (McKinney 1972), 
which authorizes the New York State Attorney General to initiate injunctive proceed-
ings "[w]henever any person shall engage in repeated fraudulent or illegal acts or 
otherwise demonstrate persistent fraud or illegality in the carrying on, conducting or 
transaction of business • • .," regardless of proof of scienter. See Lefkowitz v. Bull 
Inv. Group, Inc., 46 App. Div. 2d 25, 26, 360 N.Y.S.2d 488, 491 (Sup. Ct. 
1974). Although this is not, strictly speaking, a criminal-fraud statute (since it does 
not authorize the imposition of a prison term), its language appears to comprehend 
the kind of fraudulent conduct that could be classified as criminal. The Bull Invest-
ment case involved a marketing operation that bore the markings of a fraudulent 
pyramid scheme, which the court called "inherently fraudulent." 46 App. Div. 2d 
at 28, 360 N.Y.S.2d at 492. Unfortunately, there is a good deal of inherently fraud-
ulent conduct transpiring each day that goes untouched by our tougher criminal laws. 
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may be particularly troublesome where the complaint is directed 
toward a recently established corporation or a small group of itinerant 
"businessmen" who keep few or no records of their operations. Fur-
thermore, where the sale of a consumer item is the basis for the fraud 
complaint, prosecutors are often required to make the difficult dis-
tinction between mere puffing, which is not prohibited by the Mail 
Fraud Act (or other fraud statutes), and fraud.85 
Because there is little direct evidence bearing upon intent in many 
criminal-fraud cases, investigators are forced to search for so-called 
"badges of fraud"-that is, "a series of seemingly isolated acts" that 
allow a judge or jury to draw an inference of fraudulent intent. 86 If 
our law enforcement authorities had to contend with only a few 
serious criminal consumer-fraud cases each year, they probably would 
have little difficulty in undertaking the kind of thorough investigation 
in each case that this method of proof requires. However, limited 
enforcement and investigative resources and the increasing frequency 
of criminal-fraud offenses will not permit this luxury. Law enforce-
ment authorities are at a serious disadvantage if they do not have 
ready access to data concerning the nature and frequency of past 
complaints against particular businesses or business persons. Moni-
toring of such data would seem to offer clear investigatory advantages 
and little potential for abuse. To a great extent, the· investigatory 
problem arising from the burden of proof in crlminal consumer-fraud 
cases is one of resource management rather than of legal rigidity. 
There are, of course, other proof problems in this area of criminal 
law that may call for legal rather than administrative reform. The 
rather hazy chain of command that often connects individuals in-
volved in particular consumer-fraud schemes frequently makes it 
difficult to find and convict the ''brains" of the operation. In order 
to reach the principal behind a fraudulent scheme, the criminal law 
requires that the prosecution prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that 
the defendant knew about the conduct and participated in it in some 
way.87 Where the scheme is "sheltered" by a complex corporate 
85. See, e.g., United States v. New South Farm & Home Co., 241 U.S. 64, 71 
(1916). 
86. See Aiken v. United States, 108 F.2d 182, 183 (4th Cir. 1939). It is clear 
that direct proof of intent to defraud is not necessary in a mail-fraud prosecution; 
this element may be established circumstantially from the activities of the parties, in-
cluding prior similar transactions. See, e.g., Bass v. United States, 409 F.2d 179, 180 
(5th Cir. 1969) (submission of false financial statements); Blachly v. United States, 
380 F.2d 665 (5th Cir. 1967) (fraudulent referral-selling plan). However, the courts 
have strongly suggested that "mere 'involvement in an unsavory, high-pressure, fly-
by-night scheme' is not sufficient to establish 'knowing participation in a scheme to 
defraud.'" United States v. Piepgrass, 425 F.2d 194, 199 (9th Cir. 1970). 
81. See United States v, Interstate Engr. Corp., 288 F, Supp. 402, 412 (D.N,H. 
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structure, the task is particularly arduous. Professor Alan Dershowitz 
believes that, because "the law has yet to develop an effective 
method of pinpointing criminal responsibility in the corporate hier-
archy,"88 more severe penal sanctions will do little to deter criminal 
consumer fraud in such cases. He points out that in the absence of a 
specific command from a superior the criminal law has traditionally 
refused to look beyond the subordinate who played the key role in a 
fraudulent coporate scheme. Yet, he notes, a subordinate will gener-
ally act only as he believes his superiors would expect him to act 
under the circumstances. 89 Therefore, Dershowitz concludes, it is a 
questionable legal principle that so often immunizes corporate execu-
tives. 
The fact that many simple consumer transactions in a complex 
economy have potentially far-reaching effects should have some im-
pact upon the law regarding proof of criminal intent in criminal 
consumer-fraud cases. As entrepreneurs, manufacturers, and design-
ers introduce ever more sophisticated goods and services, the law 
should simultaneously require such persons to assume at least some 
degree of fiduciary responsibility to the public. Some recent case law 
suggests that the courts are moving in this direction in order to give 
the consumer the full protection th-at regulatory legislation is designed 
to afford. For example, in United· States v. Park,00 the Supreme 
Court affirmed the conviction of an executive of a national retail food 
chain for a violation by his company of a provision of the Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act91 despite his defense that he was not 
personally responsible for the action constituting the basis for the 
charge.92 The Court based its holding upon its reading of United 
1967). Contra, United States v. Andreadis, 366 F.2d 423 (2d Cir. 1966). The An-
dreadis case involved the sale of diet pills that were misbranded and deceptively ad-
vertised. Judge Waterman stated that the president of a corporation should not be 
able to "insulate himself' from liability under the mail-fraud statute by contending 
that he was not told that the product claims made by his advertising agencies were 
false, even if that contention were true. The court intimated that, even though the 
jucy had sufficient evidence to infer that the defendant had actual knowledge of the 
false claims, the defendant could also have been held responsible under the theory 
that he had a duty as president to verify his company's claims. 366 F.2d at 430. 
88. Dershowitz, Increasing Community Control over Corporate Crime: A Prob-
lem in the Law of Sanctions, in WlllTE-CoLLAR CRIMINAL 136, 142 (G. Geis ed. 
1968). 
89. Id. at 145. 
90. 421 U.S. 658 (1975). 
91. 21 U.S.C. § 331(k) (1970). This section basically prohibits the adulteration 
or misbranding of any food, drug, device, or cosmetic that is held for sale after ship-
ment in interstate commerce. 
92. At issue was the validity of the trial judge's jucy instruction, which was 
quoted, in part, as follows: ''The main issue for your determination is only with the 
third element, whether the Defendant held a position of authority and responsibility 
in the business of Acme Markets." 421 U.S. at 665 n.9, 
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States v. Dotterweich, 93 where the Court had closely examined the test 
for culpa:bility under :the statute. The Park Court noted that, in 
affirming the defendant's conviction in Dotterweich, 
.th[e] Court looked to the purposes of the Act and noted that they 
"touch •phases of the lives and health of people which, in the circum-
stances of modem industrialism, are largely beyond self-protection." 
It observed that the Act is of "a now familiar type" which "dispenses 
with the conventional requirement for criminal conduct-awareness 
of some wrongdoing. In the interest of the larger good it puts the 
burden of acting at hazard upon a person otherwise innocent but 
standing in responsible relation to a public danger."94 
The drafters of any new consumer-fraud statute who wish to provide 
meaningful criminal sanctions95 should examine the Dotterweich and 
Park decisions for guidance in dealing with the standard of culpabil-
ity for corporate officials who claim responsibility only for major 
managerial decisions. 
C. Prosecution 
Once the prosecutor feels that he has sufficient evidence to estab-
lish th~ government's prima facie case and rebut any anticipated 
defenses, the criminal consumer-fraud case can go to trial. At this 
point a number of obstacles to the prosecution come into play, 
making the prognosis for success poor. Prosecutor Robert Ogren 
cites the "ponderous character of the criminal process" as one of the 
basic impediments to the successful disposition of "commercial" 
white-collar crime (consumer-fraud) cases: 
Few white-collar crime cases are simple; their prosecution en-
tails an enormous expenditure of the resources of the criminal jus-
tice system in relation to -the number of cases prosecuted. As a result, 
comparatively few commercial cases are prosecuted, and those which 
are proceed at a snail's pace. The infrequency of prosecution means 
that most offenders who have been prosecuted are treated as first 
offenders even though their lives may have been spent in serious 
crime. . . . Ultimately, if the criminal justice system :is to fashion a 
credible deterrent <to commercial and economic crime, the prosecu-
tion of white-collar crime must become more than an empty gesture 
or a sporadic act of vengeance. 96 
One of the major problems is simply delay. An astute and 
experienced counsel can attempt to protect his client by requesting 
numerous conferences with the prosecutor and his superiors, by mak-
ing desperate motions with little chance of success, and by making 
93. 320 U.S. 277 (1943). 
94. 421 U.S. at 668. 
95. See text at notes 144-47 infra. 
96. Ogren, supra note 7, at 960. 
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extensive discovery requests that have a purpose more dilatory than 
informational. 97 Long delay in major criminal consumer-fraud cases 
places a severe strain on the limited manpower and resources avail-
able to the prosecutor. Even worse, the criminal system's failure to 
bring such cases to a speedy resolution allows offenders to continue 
their operations. 98 
When and if a criminal consumer-fraud case is ready to go to 
trial, attempts to plea bargain and pleas of nolo contendere are 
common. 99 The practice of plea bargaining presents troublesome 
problems in these cases. Prosecutors' limited resources require that 
they engage in this practice, yet it has, of late, become a well-
popularized defense tool in consumer-fraud cases.100 Defense attor-
neys are aware of the obstacles that prosecutors face in most fraud 
cases, and they realize that the government generally would prefer an 
immediate guilty plea rather than an extended court battle. Ironically, 
an offender faced with a thirty-count indictment under the federal 
mail-fraud statute101 has more pleading options, and therefore a 
better chance of a successfully bargained plea, than does a bank 
robber.102 Moreover, if the prosecution accepts a plea to relatively 
few counts of a multi-count indictment, the court, when sentencing, 
may not recognize the severity of the accused's actions. 
An offer by a criminal consumer-fraud defendant to plead nolo 
contendere presents the prosecutor with an even more troublesome 
decision. Not only might the judge respond to this sign of apparent 
contrition with a light sentence, but the plea enables the offender to 
deny the guilt admitted in the criminal trial in any civil litigation 
growing out of the same offense. Former federal prosecutor Herbert 
Edelhertz maintains that pleas of nolo contendere are difficult to 
justify in most white-collar criminal cases, 103 and this holds true in 
97. H. EDELHER'IZ, supra note 1, at 45. While any competent defense counsel 
would be expected to take advantage of these techniques, former prosecutor Edelhertz 
relates that defense attorneys for "big time" white-collar offenders generally are 
more vigorous, dedicated, and probably better paid than their counterparts in minor 
fraud and traditional theft cases. Id. at 45-46. 
98. For suggestions for improving the handling of major white-collar crime cases, 
see id. at 49-53. 
99. Nolo contendere pleas appear in virtually every fraud case handled by the 
U.S. Attorney's Office, District of Columbia, in which pleas are entered yet no trial 
occurs. Ogren Interview, supra note 1. 
100. It is doubtful, after federal income tax charges against former Vice-President 
Spiro Agnew were plea~bargained away, that any potential fraud offender is unaware 
of the utility of the plea bargaining process if he is ever caught. It is also reasonable 
to expect that the popularization of this procedure will have an appreciable effect 
upon the deterrence factor that any criminal sanction might embody. 
101. 18 u.s.c. § 1341 (1970). 
102. See H. EDELHE.R'IZ, supra note 1, at S4, 
103. Id. at S6, 
March 1976] Criminal Consumer Fraud 685 
criminal consumer-fraud cases as well. Sound prosecutorial discre-
tion at the investigatory stage of a criminal consumer-fraud case 
should usually eliminate the value of the nolo plea in the bargaining 
process. If the prosecution believes that it cannot develop a strong 
case against a fraud offender prior to trial, a dismissal is warranted.104 
D. Sanctions 
If the threat of a substantial period of incarceration is necessary to 
deter effectively criminal consumer frauds, the accomplishment of 
this goal is hindered by the prosecutors' frequent decision to plea 
bargain with known offenders.105 In addition, the sentencing options 
currently available under both state and federal law may generally be 
insufficient, either in substance or in practice, adequately to deter 
criminal consumer fraud. A sampling of the basic fraud and theft-
by-fraud statutes (false advertising, false pretenses, and larceny by 
trick) in five states and the District of Columbia reveals an entire 
gamut of sanctions. The periods of incarceration allowed by some 
statues are surprisingly long, while others are relatively short. For 
example, the ~nal sanctions made available to the sentencing judge 
for the offenses of larceny by trick and false pretenses in Alabama, 106 
California, 107 Massachusetts, 108 Ohio, 109 Wisconsin, 110 and -the District 
104. Id. 
105. Id. at 55. See also Ogren, supra note 7, at 966. 
106. See ALA. CoDE tit. 14, ,§ 209 (1959) (providing that any person found guilty 
of obtaining property under false pretenses shall be punished as if he had stolen the 
property); ALA. CoDE tit. 14, § 331 (Supp. 1973) (defining the crime of grand lar-
ceny and providing for imprisonment of from one to ten years if the value of prop-
erty stolen is five dollars or more). 
107. See CAL. PENAL Core§§ 484, 487, 488, 489, 490, 531 (West 1970). These 
sections cover theft by fraud and false pretenses and, if the value of the property 
stolen is greater than $200, provide a penalty of imprisonment for not more than one 
year in city jail or not more than ten years in state prison. If the value is less than 
$200, the penalty is a maximum of $500 or incarceration in jail for six months, or 
both. 
108. See MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 266, §§ 30, 75 (Supp. 1974). These sections 
make larceny by trick punishable by up to five years' imprisonment or a $600 fine 
and two years in jail when the value of the propexy stolen is over $100. If the value 
is under $100, the maximum penalty authorized is a $300 fine or one year in jail. 
109. See Omo REv. CODE .ANN.§§ 2913.102, 2929.11, .21 (1975). These sections 
punish theft "by deception" with a maximum fine of $1,000 and/or maximum impris-
onment of six months if the value of :the property stolen is less than $150 (petty 
theft, a misdemeanor of the first degree). If the value of the property stolen is 
greater than $150 (grand theft, a felony of the fourth degree), imprisonment may 
range from a minimum of six months to a maximum of five years and the offense 
may carxy a maximum fine of $2,500. 
110. See Wis. SrAT. ANN. § 943.20 (Supp. 1975). This section punishes theft 
by false pretenses with a minimum fine of $200 and maximum imprisonment for six 
months, or both, if the 'Value of the property taken is less than $100. If the value 
of the property taken is over $100 but less than $2,500, a maximum fine of $5000 
and/or five-years imprisonment is imposed. If the value of the stolen property is 
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of Columbia111 appear to be substantial on their face. The penal 
sanctions provided in these jurisdictions for fraudulent and deceptive 
adver.tising are generally less severe.112 However, even where the 
statutes giving a sentencing judge the authority to impose lengthy im-
prisonment, substantial prison terms are rarely meted out in criminal 
consumer-fraud cases. This is so both because the statutes have been 
narrowly construed and because judges have treated white-collar 
offenders leniently .113 
The federal statutes similarly do not appear to provide the poten-
tial perpetrator of criminal consumer fraud with a realistic expecta-
tion of substantial incarceration. Robert Ogren, Chief of the Fraud 
Unit of •the United States Attorney's Office for the District of Colum-
bia (which can bring criminal fraud prosecutions under both district 
and federal statutes) notes that most of the federal statutes pertaining 
to fraud offenses provide for a prison term of no more than five 
years.114 Even though his list of ten federal statutes with five-year 
maximums might appear to provide the fraud unit with an impressive 
law enforcement arsenal, the truth is that even these federal weapons 
cannot counter the barrage of criminal consumer frauds in the Dis-
itrict of Columbia. Ogren laments that, even when a conviction is 
obtained under one or more of these statutes, the sanction finally 
over $2,500, the statutory maximums are raised to $10,000 or fifteen years' imprison-
ment, or both. 
111. See D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 22-1301, -2201 (1973). Section 22-1301 punishes 
theft by false pretenses with imprisonment for from one to three years if the property 
stolen is worth $100 or more. If the value is less than $100, the maximum penalties 
are $1,000 and one year in prison. Section 22-2201 covers grand larceny and pun-
ishes an offender convicted of larceny by trick with from one-to-ten-years imprison-
ment if the value of the property taken is $100 or more. 
112. See Au. CoDE tit 14, § 211(f) (1959) (making false advertising a misde-
meanor punishable by a fine of not less than $25 nor more than $1,000 or sixty days 
in jail, or both); CAL. Crv. CoDE §§ 3369, 3370.1 (West Supp. 1975) (providing only 
a maximum fine of $2,500 as a civil penalty for deceptive advertising); D.C. CoDB 
ANN. §§ 22-1411 to -1413 (1973) (providing a maximum fine of $500 and incarcera-
tion for up to 60 days, or both, for persons, firms, and associations, and, if the of-
fender is a corporation, providing that its present or other officials responsible may 
be imprisoned for up to 60 days); MAss. ANN. l.Aws ch. 266, •§ 91 (1968) (providing, 
a fine of not less than $500 nor more than $1,000 for false and deceptive advertis-
ing); Omo REv. CoDE ANN. §§ 4165.02 to .04 (1973) (covering various deceptive 
trade practices including false advertising, but providing an injunctive remedy only); 
Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 100.18, .26 (1973) (covering a variety of fraudulent advertising 
practices, most of which are punishable by a maximum fine of $200 or up to six 
months imprisonment, or both). 
113. For an example of the problems of prosecuting criminal consumer frauds 
under the traditional false pretenses, larceny by trick, and false advertising statutes 
in Ohio, see Saxbe, The Role of the Government in Consumer Protection: The Con-
sumer Frauds and Crimes Section of the Office of the Ohio Attorney General, 29 
Omo ST. W. 897 (1968). 
114. Ogren, supra note 7, at 964. 
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imposed generally serves only "a symbolic purpose."115 
Meaningful sanctions do not automatically follow from a suc-
cessful criminal consumer-fraud prosecution, particularly if the pre-
siding judge is not adequately informed of the severity of the crime's 
impact upon ·both its individual victims and the community. Because 
of the rippling impact of criminal fraud, the prosecutor is rarely able 
to bring most of a _scheme's victims into the courtroom to describe its 
effect upon them. Furthermore, the defendant's counsel will gen-
erally recommend a guilty plea to the original or a reduced charge116 
if he anticipates that a full-blown trial will reveal the full extent of the 
harm inflicted by the offense. If such a plea is entered, -the judge 
may look only at the bare language of the indictment plus a pre-
sentence report before deciding upon an appropriate sentence.117 
Prosecutors, perhaps out of sympathy for the defendant's devastated 
family, are often reluctant to make stiff sentencing recommendations 
even where such recommendations are permitted. The feeling 
among prosecutors seems to be that once the case is properly pre-
sented at trial their role ends and it is the court's responsibility to see 
that justice is done.118 All of these factors contribute to the unfortun-
ate lack of communication that is largely responsible for the failure of 
many judges rt:o treat major consumer-fraud offenders as dangerous 
criminals.119 
Even where the sentencing judge imposes a substantial penal 
sentence, the criminal consumer-fraud offender rarely remains con-
fined for more than the minimum term prescribed.120 Observes 
Ogren, "If the assumption that many white-collar criminals are so-
phisticated offenders is accurate, then they have probably discerned 
that it is rare to serve more than three years in prison, and virtually 
impossible to serve that much time if -they plead guilty to the 
charges."121 There is no question that when a major fraud offender 
is convicted after victimizing an entire community, _and then serves 
115. Id. at 960. Ogren reports that, out of a total of 82 persons sentenced in 
significant fraud or corruption felony cases in the United States District Court for 
the District of Columbia during a recent three-year period, only 20 were given maxi-
mum prison sentences in excess of three years. Of this group, no defendant has yet 
served more than one-third of his imposed sentence. Id. at 962. 
116. See text at notes 101-02 supra. 
117. See H. EDELHER1Z, supra note 1, at 61 n.8. Edelhertz suggests that, since 
the vast majority of criminal consumer-fraud defendants have no prior criminal rec-
ords, the pre-sentence reports could be most useful in fraud cases to inform judges 
of the full economic and human impact of the crime. Id. at 63. 
118. Ogren Interview, supra note 1. 
119. Cf. H. EDELHERTZ, supra note 1, at 43. 
120. For an account of various sentence-reduction provisions under federal law, 
see Ogren, supra note 7, at 963. 
121. Id. at 963-64. 
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only a light sentence, lthe word gets out to the rest of the extra-legal 
community that deception remains a profitable enterprise. 
The imposition of penal sanctions in criminal consumer-fraud 
cases may be subject not only to these practical problems, but also to 
a theoretical challenge. lit has been argued that such sanctions do not 
adequately serve the needs of the victims. The victims' primary need, 
posits the argument, is compensation rather th·an retribution. A 
related controversy exists over whether :the costs of further criminaliz-
ing consumer fraud will actually be borne by those victimized. To-
gether, these concerns may suggest that the focus in dealing with 
consumer fraud should be on other than criminal prosecution. 
Ogren observes that, from the victim's standpoint, ai criminal 
prosecµtion may seem futile; it will merely delay his own prospect of 
recovery in exchange for what usually amounts to a slap on the wrist 
for the convicted offender. Since all parallel proceedings are com-
monly stayed once a criminal case is initiated, 122 victims of criminal 
consumer-fraud who become aware of a pending prosecution against 
the perpetrator commonly pursue one of two avenues for a remedy-
settlement or restitution. Unfortunately, there are practical prob-
lems with both. 
Edelhertz points out that, for several reasons, a civil settlement 
between a fraudulent merchant and his victims during a criminal 
investigation or prosecution may have an adverse effect on the public 
interest. The prosecutor faced with lthe possibility of a civil settle-
ment may doubt the desirability of a lengthy prosecution that will not 
offer the victims any substantial relief. Victims are less enthusiastic 
about testifying for the state once settlement has been made, and 
defense attorneys in their appeals for leniency often attempt to bring a 
settlement to •the attention of the court or jury.123 Furthermore, 
settlement during the investigatory or early prosecutorial stages of a 
criminal consumer-fraud case may prevent the unearthing of addi-
tional facts that might have revealed that the scope of the fraud was 
broader lthan was originally thought. The end result is that the law 
may become party to a bargain with •the offender at ,the public's 
expense. Law enforcement should not end at the identification of a 
consumer-fraud victim or class of victims; it should go on to ensure 
that such victimization will not recur. 
The victim's other common recourse, "restitution" in the criminal 
case, 124 has been touted as the most effective method of achieving the 
122. Id. at 980. 
123. H. EDELHERTZ, supra note 1, at 29-31. 
124. The idea is to give the convicted offender a suspended sentence with proba-
tion conditioned upon payment of monthly installments into a restitution fund. 
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combined goals of deterrence and compensation.125 Ogren, however, 
based on his first-hand experience with this remedy, believes that for 
several reasons it is "an unrealistic objective."126 First, criminal 
consumer-fraud offenders rarely have sufficient assets to comply with 
a post-conviction restitution order.127 Second, even where assets can 
be found, American courts -are limited in the restitution procedure to 
ordering the payment of "reasonable" amounts even though the fraud 
may have made it impossible for a victim to live comfortably. Third, 
the limited experience of the District of Columbia courts with court-
ordered restitution has shown that a great many administrative prob-
lems must be ironed out before its utility can be fully determined.128 
Finally, despite the fact that compensation is usually as difficult to 
achieve in civil cases as it is in criminal cases, what little restitution is 
made in a civil case after settlement or judgment will at least reach the 
victim more quickly than any relief deriving from a criminal prosecu-
tion. 
Considered by themselves, -these points suggest that the law 
should rely more heavily upon a civil approach to criminal consumer 
fraud in order better to serve the needs of its victims. Certainly, the 
tension between criminal and civil sanctions would require statutory 
balancing to achieve the dual purposes of deterrence -and compensa-
·tion. However, if the argument means that the enactment of stiffer 
criminal sanctions is not an appropriate response to the criminal 
consumer-fraud problem, it takes too narrow a view. If ,the victims 
are presented with a choice not between quick but -token compensa-
tion and a prosecution with only symbolic effect, but rather between 
token relief and a prosecution that will place the offender where he 
125. When the Monarch problem first arose, see note 127 infra, the United States 
Attorney's Office believed restitution was the most effective remedy. It now regards 
it as a "Rube Goldberg contraption," where the fraud perpetrator steals from new 
victims to repay old. Ogren Interview, supra note 1. See also J. CARPER, supra note 
63, at 196-98. 
126. Ogren, supra note 7, at 979. 
127. The Monarch Construction Co. fraud case, prosecuted in the District of Co-
lumbia, see United States v. Cohen, Crim. No. 412-70 (D.D.C., Jan. 8, 1971); United 
States"'· Clark, Crim. No. 472-70 (D.D.C., Jan. 8, 1971); United States v. Green-
field, Crim. No. 715-70 (D.D.C., Jan. 11, 1971), provided a good example of this 
"empty pockets" phenomenon. Although hundreds of victims were swindled out of 
hundreds of thousands of dollars in the .form of promissory notes and mortgages, the 
masterminds of that home repair racket had comparatively little to contribute to a 
court-ordered restitution fund after they were convicted. See generally J. CARPER, 
supra note 63. To date, six years after their scheme was uncovered, the three de-
fendants have paid only about $60,000 into the restitution fund, and it is not expected 
that they will ever pay more than $90,000. Prosecutor Robert Ogren concluded that 
"the restitution order in the Monarch case has proven to be frustrating for the victims 
and a headache for the courts." Ogren Interview, supra note 1. 
128. See Ogren, supra note 7, at 980 n.63-. 
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can do no further harm in the community, it is likely that they will 
opt for the latter. Under -this broader view, the interest of victimized 
consumers in deterring criminal fraud parallels that of society as a 
whole. 
E. Deterrence-The Central Goal 
Reconciliation of the apparent conflict between further criminal-
izing consumer fraud and compensating those who are victimized can 
be accomplished by considering the problem in terms of the central 
goal-deterrence. In the final analysis, the question facing both 
legislator and judge is this: If we begin putting hard-core business-
fraud offenders behind bars for substantial periods of time, will this 
deter others from engaging in similar unconscionable conduct? Un-
fortunately, no hard data exist Ith.at can provide an easy answer to this 
question. This is in part due to the fact that legislators and 
prosecutors in most jurisdictions :have not yet begun to treat the 
habitual criminal consumer-fraud offender like the professional crimi-
nal that he is. While the nation's law enforcement authorities do not 
all agree that stiffer penai sanotions will rid our cities of the criminal 
consumer-fraud problem, most would probably agree that our current 
methods do not accomplish this goal. 
At a time when criminal consumer fraud is reaching epidemic 
proportions, legislators and judges cannot afford to ignore the argu-
ments of the sociologists that this type of offender can be deterred, 
perhaps even more effectively than can traditional common-law of-
fenders, by a realistic threat of imprisonment. Ogren questions the 
ability of the criminal sanction to deter the illegal conduct of fraud 
offenders who are motivated by "economic necessity."129 There is, 
however, a distinct difference between the inept businesspersons who 
occasionally commit frauds when caught in the competitive crunch of 
an unhealthy economy and those offenders who make consumer fraud 
their business. And it is likely that most serious consumer frauds are 
committed by the latter, narrow, fringe element in the business com-
munity. 
The habitual criminal consumer-fraud offender can and should be 
isolated from the larger group. It is his decision intentionally to 
defraud the public on a day-to-day basis that transfers him from the 
129. Id. at 974. In his discussion of the motivations of white-collar criminals, 
Ogren states: "The population of fraud offenders includes stable, well-educated cor-
porate executives, but it also includes struggling entrepreneurs, hucksters, 'rain mak-
ers,' promoters of fly-by-night stocks, alcoholics, psychopaths, and a heavy sprinkling 
of bad businessmen and persons caught in serious economic distress," Id, 
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illusory white-collar category to the caste of the "con artist," the petty 
hoodlum, and the fly-by-night operator. This district type of fraud 
offender should be the focus of a program of tough criminal sanc-
tions. Substantial prison sentences would keep the hard-core con-
sumer-fraud offender off the streets, just as other offenders who 
continue to pose a threat to the public are removed, at least temporar-
ily, from society.130 Moreover, further criminalization of fraudulent 
conduct in the marketplace would probably have a broad deterrent 
effect. While it might not deter those who negligently or mistakenly 
exploit consumers, it would put the merchant or professional intend-
ing to profit from misrepresentation and deceit on notice that such 
conduct will no longer be tolerated. 
ill. SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 
There is at present no ascertainable concerted effort to deal with 
criminal consumer fraud at any level of government, and the enig-
matic nature of the offense creates many enforcement problems. Nev-
ertheless, select police departments, prosecutors, and judges have be-
come sensitized to the problems caused by this crime and are 
developing effective solutions. Researchers, aided by institutions 
such as the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA), 
are also working in the area._ Legislators, reacting to the adverse 
impact of criminal consumer fraud, are proposing new legislation 
codifying both tested and newly proposed solutions. The authors are 
participating in one local prototype effort.131 This section categorizes 
some of the prominent local efforts to provide solutions to the 
previously discussed problems of investigation, prosecution, restitu-
tion, and sentencing. These examples illustrate our thesis about 
solutions to these problems. 
A. Investigation 
Perhaps the most frustrating obstacles to ·the attack on criminal 
consumer fraud are those encountered in investigation, the sine qua 
non of any successful prosecution of criminal consumer fraud. A 
promising method of overcoming many of these obstacles has been 
130. The drafters of the 1967 Presidential Task Force Report on Crime and Its 
Impact appeared to reoognim that deterrence may work with at least certain types 
of consumer-fraud offenders. They concluded that, while long periods of incarcera-
tion are probably not needed to protect the public from the further criminality of 
many kinds of white-collar offenders, "among some classes of white-collar offenders, 
such a$ those guilty of cheating consumers, recidivism may be a serious problem." 
1967 TASK FOR.CB RE.PORT, supra note 17, at 104. 
131. See note 181 infra and accompanying text. 
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implemented in the District of Columbia's newly created fraud divi-
sion. This is a three-pronged effort, funded by the Office of Crimi-
nal Justice Plans and Analysis (LEAA) through the District of 
Columbia, that consists of developing new methods of complaint-
screening and data-dissemination, establishing a team of prosecution-
oriented personnel, and using local police to assist in flushing out 
major offenders. 
Personnel in all of the existing Washington metropolitan area 
offices that ,receive consumer complaints (either by mail, phone, or in 
person) are being trained to use a questionnaire designed to permit 
determination whether a complaint alleges •an apparent intention to 
lie, cheat, or steal. If it appears from the response that such an 
allegation is contained fu. the complaint, a special complaint form is 
filled out for data processing. This form is coded and then batch-
processed and stored in Justice Department computers.132 This data 
can be instantaneously retrieved through an on-line computer terminal 
by lawyers in the fraud division of the United States Attorney's 
office. This retrieval system is designed to convey a large amount of 
information in a variety of ways: It saves time in the initial pre-
investigation screening of complaints, and then assists law enforce-
ment authorities in their actual investigation by enabling them to 
discern "patterns or profiles" of fraud alleged in a specific jurisdic-
tion. 
The hub of this fraud team is the Fraud Division of the Office of 
the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia. Until 1967, 
when a number of home repair rackets -rocked the metropolitan area, 
the office had no fraud division. At that time, the United States 
District Attorney established one and designated Seymour Glanzer, a 
member of the office's white-collar crime division, as its chief and sole 
attorney. The Department of Justice then sent one of its attorneys 
over to join Glanzer. Robert Ogren has since taken over as director, 
and the fraud division now consists of nine full-time attorneys. The 
division's attorneys utilize the information received from the partici-
pating agencies to investigate and prosecute consumer-fraud cases; 
priority is given to cases that illustrate either a single shocking exam-
ple of criminal consumer fraud or -a pattern of fraudulent practices. 
There have been some clear indications that the division has 
already achieved considerable success in curtailing the proliferation of 
criminal consumer frauds in the District of Columbia. There is 
room, however, to increase its effectiveness. Although the division 
132. The coding system was developed by Consumer H-E-L-P under an LEAA 
grant. 
March 1976] Criminal Consumer Fraud 693 
theoretically should be able to draw upon the investigatory arms of a 
number of federal agencies, to date it has had to rely chiefly upon the 
assistance of the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Depart-
ment and, to a lesser extent, upon the aid of the FBI, the Postal 
Inspection Service, and ·the SEC. - The division remains hopeful that, 
in addition, federal agencies such as the FTC, •the FDA, and the 
Department of Agriculture will play an increasing role in bringing 
major fraud cases to its attention. Success breeds cooperation. 
The fraud division advocated the establishment of the ·third part 
of the fraud team, a special "bunco squad" in the District police 
department. The squad, designed to specia.liz.e in fraud investigation 
free from the time-consuming check cases that continue to bog down 
the department, was finally established in the spring of 197 5 and has 
just begun work in cooperation with the division. The squad consists 
of five detectives who are being specially trained in accounting and 
consumer schemes under an LEAA grant. The bunco squad con-
cept, pioneered in Los Angeles, is simple and effective: It brings into 
a consumer fraud investigation the expertise necessary to determine 
whether there is probable intent to lie, cheat, or steal, while at the 
same time accumulating evidence to that effect. For example, the 
Los Angeles Police Department Fraud and Bunco Squad has attacked 
the problem of crooked auto repair_ shops by rigging vehicles operated 
by undercover officers with easily detectable defects and then tape 
recording conversations with garage operators. 
The newly developed cooperative effort among the fraud division, 
the police department, and local government offices of consumer 
affairs is certain .to improve investigation and promote the successful 
prosecution of criminal consumer-fraud offenders. The news of 
successful prosecutions quickly filters down rt:o the marketplace level 
and has a marked impact upon potential offenders. Ogren cites, for 
example, the fact that his office has had to indict for only one home 
improvement scheme since 1968 (one under indictment at this writ-
ing)-a statistic that he attributes to the successful -prosecution of a 
number of such schemes in the District of Columbia in the late 
sixties.133 Both Ogren and Glanzer agree that the key to ridding the 
community of criminal fraud activity is to "put ·the heat on"-to place 
,the potential offender on notice that if he pursues a deceptive course 
of business, he will be put out of business and into jail.134 
133. Ogren Interview, supra note 1. 
134. Interview with Seymour Glanzer, former Chief of the Fraud Division of the 
United. States Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia, in Washington, D.C., 
Nov. 25, 1974 [hereinafter Glamer Interview]. 
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B. Prosecution 
Examples are abundant of the importance for effective prosecu-
tion of obtaining an overall profile of significant criminal consumer 
fraud. Careful priorities for targeting prosecutions must be devel-
oped in order most effectively to utilize prosecutorial resources. 
Ogren feels that United States v. Sells,185 for example, was a signifi-
cant case for his office because it was resolved through the use of an 
economical pre-indictment technique. The offender was a member 
of a group of itinerant consumer-fraud offenders that operated out of 
a Virginia motel and preyed upon the elderly in the District of 
Columbia area by promising roofing work, obtaining payment in full 
by check, and delivering nothing. After receiving between 400 and 
500 complaints during the summer and fall of 197 4, totaling almost 
$250,000 in losses, the fraud division brought Sells into its office and, 
after describing its .case, induced him to plead guilty to an informa-
tion for conspiracy to commit interstate transport of stolen property. 
The prosecutors persuaded the defendant to return the money rthat he 
had stolen and the judge sentenced him to five-years imprisonment. 
Ogren maintains that this kind of pre-indictment disposition is partic-
ularly effective in the case of first offenders, who may be offered a 
chance to avoid conviction if the offense is not too severe and the 
offender is willing to make restitution. "Rapid turnover of cases is 
the name of the game in this area of the law," says Ogren. "The 
pre-indictment disposition is designed to help maximize our case load 
whereas full-blown prosecutions in which multiple victims must be 
sought out to prove criminal intent merely exhaust our manpower."130 
Almost fifty per cent of the cases that come to the District of Colum-
bia fraud division are now disposed of in •this manner. 
Also crucial to effective prosecution, because of the existing 
absence of a criminal definition of consumer fraud, is the prudent 
selection of statutes under which to prosecute. The fraud division 
has targeted prosecution toward the most serious offenses by using a 
combination of techniques that employ both local and federal stat-
utes. For example, Green v. United States181 involved a "bait and 
switch" scheme in which the defendant advertised that he had new 
sewing machines available for immediate delivery at a price of $63. 
He failed to disclose that customers responding to the ad would be 
135. Crim. No. 74-953 (D.D.C., Jan. 10, 1975). 
136. Ogren Interview, supra note 1. For an example of another recent pre-indict-
ment disposition by the fraud division, see United States v. Gochoel, Crim. No, 75-
241 (D.D.c., May 9, 1975). 
137. 312 A.2d 788 (D,C. App, 1973), 
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told that "the base and the foot pedal, needed to turn the machine on 
and off and to regulate the speed of the motor, had to be obtained at 
additional cost."138 Says Ogren, "This man lived off 'bait and 
switch.' He couldn't survive in business in any other way."139 The 
defendant was charged and convicted on a sixty-count indictment for 
violating the fraudulent advertising statute of the District of Colum-
bia, 140 which makes each publication of a fraudulent advertisement 
punishable by a fine of not more than $500 or imprisonment for sixty 
days, or both. He was fined $24,000 and sentenced to sixty days in 
jail. 
C. Restitution 
The fraud division's successful prosecutions of home-improve-
ment schemes in the Monarch Construction Co. case141 and in United 
States v. Shulman142 have had an ,in terrorem effect on potential fraud 
offenders of the same ilk. This illustrates the importance of concen-
trating prosecutorial resources upon 1lb.ose criminal consumer-fraud 
cases !that have a significant adverse impact on the community, partic-
ularly where those who are victimized are low-income consumers. 
Such cases, however, pose the dilemma between criminal prosecu-
tion and consumer recovery. In the Monarch case, the principals 
behind a scheme that defrauded hundreds of people of hundreds of 
thousands of dollars pleaded guilty to mail fraud and received sus-
pended sentences of from one to five years, conditioned upon restitu-. 
tion being made to the victims. Although the court's restitution 
order initially appeared to be a major breakthrough in the largely 
unexplored area of victim compensation, the hopes of the judge, 
prosecutors, and victims were quickly shattered by seemingly insur-
mountable administrative problems. Ogren now believes that, at 
most, $80,000 to $90,000 of the losses will be repaid. The prosecu-
tors, who had assembled a well-developed case against the offenders, 
could only watch in frustration as the judge set free those convicted 
while most of the victims were left with a ninety-per cent loss.143 
138. 312 A.2d at 791. 
139. Ogren Interview, supra note 1. 
140. D.C. CoDEANN. § 22-1411 (1973). 
141. United States v. Cohen, Crim. No. 412-70 (D.D.C., Jan. ·8, 1971); United 
States v. Clark, Crim. No. 472-70 (D.D.C., Jan. 8, 1971); United States v. Green-
field, Crim. No. 715-70 (D.D.C., Jan. 11, 1971). 
142. Crim. No. 147-68 (D.D.C., March 21, 1969), affd. per curiam, No. 23,009 
(D.C. Cir., June 25,1970). 
143. Furthermore, at least one of the defendants in the Monarch case is now, five 
years later, under investigation for subsequently engaging in questionable business 
practices. See Washington Post, March 8, 1975, at Al, col. 1. 
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There is no reason why a tough penal) approach to criminal 
consumer fraud cannot accommodate an effective restitution order. In 
fact, the threat of prolonged incarceration can provide sufficient 
incentive for the fraud offender to make vigorous efforts to return to 
the community that which he stole. If probation is to be used 
successfully to provide restitution for low-income consumers who 
have incurred severe economic injury, the compensation must be tied 
to actual losses. Innovation is needed to deal with the plethora of 
administrative problems that the restitution remedy poses, but solu-
tions are not unattainable. We suggest that the courts might profita-
bly appoint special masters to develop flexible responses to the de-
mands of each case. This would relieve presiding judges of a 
substantial post-sentencing supervisory burden and would allow the 
courts to exercise greater vigilance over their fraud probationers. 
D. Sentencing 
Prosecution inevitably lays bare not onlythe issue of repayment, 
but also the problems of sentencing and underlying statutory inade-
quacies. For e:x:ample, the defendant in Shulman cheated about 
. seventy District of Columbia! residents out of over $250,000 by 
forging second mortgages. His victims included the elderly, the poor, 
and the handicapped, many of whom were forced to sell their homes 
in order to pay off their unexpected debts. Although the fraud unit 
staff knew that Shulman had been associated with similar home 
improvement schemes before, they had previously been unable to 
obtain a conviction.144 This time the defendant was convicted of 
mail and wire fraud.145 Although the sentencing judge could have 
imposed consecutive sentences for separate counts of mail and wire 
fraud, the defendant was sentenced concurrently on the multiple 
counts to from twenty months to five years in prison.146 No restitu-
144. Ogren, supra note 7, at 965 n.26. 
145. Shulman was convicted under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (1970). 
146. Other examples of lenient sentencing of white-collar crinlinals abound. For 
example, in United States v. Ferebee, Crim. No. 259-71 (D.D.C., March 3, 1972), 
the defendant billed customers for automobile parts that he never installed and in-
stalled new parts when repairs were not needed. After defrauding a large number 
of customers out of an average of $300 per car, complaints were made to the FfC 
that finally put him out of business. After destroying his business records, Ferebee 
set up shop once again under an assumed name, and, when Neighborhood Legal Serv-
ices started receiving complaints, the fraud division stepped in with an arrest for vio-
lations of the mail fraud, larceny by trick, and false pretenses statutes. Despite the 
clear-cut case against the offender, all but three months of his 1- to 4-year sentence 
was suspended by the presiding judge. In United States v. Cherry, Crim. No. 68-
70 (D.D.C., Feb. 10, 1970), after the defendant's furniture, moving, and storage 
scheme was uncovered by the fraud division, he was prosecuted under the mail-and 
wire-fraud statutes. Even though he stole almost all of the property of one hapless 
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tion was ever made. The punishment simply did not fit the crime. 
While both Ogren and Glanzer can proudly point to a record of 
prosecution that has rid the District of Columbia and its environs of a 
great deal of criminal consumer fraud, they both readily admit that 
the problems hindering its effective prosecution are far from resolved. 
Glanzer explains that th.ere is not only a general need for more 
effective sanctions, but that the prosecution of consumer-fraud cases 
is needlessly complicated by the existence of archaic theft statutes· that 
lack real deterrent value and are ill-designed for the task of attacking 
an endless variety of fraudulent schemes.147 Even though the District 
of Columbia !fraud division continues to operate as a sound law 
~nforcement model, actual deterrence does not stop with the prosecu-
torial function. A general consumer-fraud statute that clearly defines 
the criminal conduct and provides for substantial penal sanctions is 
necessary to solve the existing deterrence problem. 
E. Statutory Reform 
There are currently before Congress two propo~ed versions of a 
new federal criminal code that would replace title 18 of the current 
United States Code. Each would make substantial organizational 
changes affecting the kinds of theft that we have denominated crimi-
nal consumer fraud. 
Representative Kastenmeir's proposal, H.R. 333,148 embodies the 
provisions set forth in the final report of the National Commission 
on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws.149 One of the major reforms 
proposed by the Commission is the consolidation and unification of 
the dozens of existing provisions dealing with the taking of property 
of another. The resolution provides: "Conduct denominated theft in 
sections 1732 to 1734 constitutes a single offense designed to include 
the separate offenses heretofore known as larceny, stealing, purloin-
ing, embezzlement, obtaining money or property by false pretenses, 
family by padding charges and making fraudulent misrepresentations, the presiding 
judge imposed a penalty of unsupervised probation for one year. 
According to a 1972 sentencing study of the Southern District of New York, 
"[t]here are plain indications that white-collar defendants, predominantly white, re-
ceive more lenient treatment as a general rule, while defendants charged with com-
mon crimes, largely committed by the unemployed and undereducated, a group which 
embraces large numbers of blacks in today's society, are more likely to be sent to 
prison." Seymour, Social and Ethical Considerations in Assessing White-Collar 
Crime, 11 AM. C!uM. L REV'. 821, 827-34 (1973). 
147. Glanzer Intervi~w, supra note 134. 
148. aR. 333, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (197S). 
149. FINAL REl'ORr OF THE NATIONAL CoMMJSSION ON REFORM OF F'EDBRAL 
CRIMINAL LA.ws: A PRoPOSED NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL CoDB (1971) [hereinafter 
FINAL REPoin-]. 
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extortion, blackmail, fraudulent conversion, receiving stolen property, 
and the like."150 Theft under these sections is graded according to 
the seriousness of the threat, if one is involved, and the value of the 
property or services stolen.1111 Class B felonies are punishable by not 
150. H.R. 333, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1731(1) (1975). 
Proposed sections 1732 to 1734 provide: 
§ 1732. Theft of property 
A person is guilty of theft if he-
(a) knowingly takes or exercises unauthorized control over, or makes 
an unauthorized transfer of an interest in, the property of another with intent 
to deprive the owner thereof; 
(b) knowingly obtains the property of another by deception or by threat 
with intent to deprive the owner thereof, or intentionally deprives another of 
his property by deception or by threat; or 
(c) knowingly receives, retains, or disposes of property of another which 
has been stolen, with intent to deprive the owner thereof. 
§ 1733. Theft of services 
A person is guilty of theft if-
(a) he intentionally obtains services, known by him to be available only 
for compensation, by deception, threat, false token, or other means to avoid 
payment for the services; or 
(b) having control over the disposition of services of another to which he 
is not entitled, he knowingly diverts those services to his own benefit or to 
the benefit of another not entitled thereto. 
Where compensation for services is ordinarily paid immediately upon their 
rendition, as in the case of hotels, restaurants, and comparable establishments, 
absconding without payment or making provision to pay is prima facie evi-
dence that the services were obtained by deception. 
§ 1734. Theft of property lost, mislaid, or delivered by mistake 
A person is guilty of theft if he-
(a) retains or disposes of property of another when he knows it has been 
lost or mislaid, or 
(b) retains or disposes of property of another when he knows it has been 
delivered under a mistake as to the identity of the recipient or as to the nature 
or amount of property, 
and with intent to deprive the owner of it, he fails to take readily available and 
reasonable measures to restore the property to a person entitled to have it. 
151. H.R. 333, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. ·§ 1735 (1975). Proposed section 1735 pro-
vides: 
§ 1735. Grading of theft offenses under sections 1732 to 1734 
(1) CJ.Ass B FELONY-Theft under sections 1732 to 1734 is a class B 
felony if the property or services stolen exceed $100,000 in value or are acquired 
or retained by a threat to commit a class A or class B felony or to inflict serious 
bodily injury on the person threatened or on any other person. 
(2) Cuss C FELONY.-Theft under sections 1732 to 1734 is a class C fel-
ony if-
(a) the property or services stolen exceed $500 in value; 
(b) the property or services stolen are acquired or retained by threat and 
(i) are acquired or retained by a public servant by a threat to take or with-
hold official action, or (ii) exceed $50 in value; 
(c) the property or services stolen exceed $50 in value and are acquired 
or retained by a public servant in the course of his official duties; 
(d) the property stolen is a firearm, ammunition, explosive, or destructive 
device or an automobile, aircraft, or other motor-propelled vehicle; 
(e) the property consists of any government file, record, document, or 
other government paper stolen from any government office or from any public 
servant; 
(f) the defendant is in the business of buying or selling stolen property 
and he receives, retains, or disposes of the property in the course of that busi-
ness; 
(g) the property stolen consists of any implement, paper, or other thing 
uniquely associated with the preparation of any money, stamp, bond, or other 
document, instrument, or obligation of the United States; 
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more than fifteen years' imprisonment152 and a fine not to exceed 
$10,000.153 Class C felonies are punishable by imprisonment for not 
more than seven years154 and by-a fine not to exceed $5000.155 
(h) the property stolen consists of a key or other implement uniquely 
suited to provide access to property the theft of which would be a felony and 
it was stolen to gain such access; or . 
(i) the property is stolen from the United States mail and is first-class 
mail or airmail. 
(3) CI.Ass A MISDBMEANOR.-All other theft under sections 1732 to 1734 
is a class A misdemeanor, unless the requirements of subsection (4) or (5) are 
met. 
(4) Cuss B MISDBMEANOR.-Theft under sections 1732 to 1734 of property 
or services of a value not exceeding $50 shall be a class B misdemeanor if-
( a) the theft was not committed by threat; 
(b) the theft was not committed by deception by one who stood in a con-
fidential or fiduciary relationship to the victim of the theft; and 
( c) the defendant was not a public servant or an officer or employee of 
a financial institution who committed the theft in the course of his official 
duties. 
The special classification provided in this subsection shall apply if the offense 
is classified under this subsection in the charge or if, at sentencing, the required 
factors are established by a preponderance of the evidence. 
(5) lNFRAcnoN.-Theft under section 1733 of services of a value not ex-
ceeding $10 shall be an infraction if the defendant was not a public servant who 
committed the theft in the course of his official duties. The special classification 
provided in this subsection shall apply if the offense is classified under this sub-
section in the charge or if, at sentencing, the required factors are established by 
a preponderance of the evidence. . 
(6) ATI'EMPT.-Notwithstanding the provisions of section 1001(3), an at-
tempt to commit a theft under sections 1732 to 1734 is punishable equally with 
the completed offense when the actor has completed all of the conduct which 
he believes necessary on his part to complete the theft except receipt of the 
property. 
(7) VALUATION.-For purposes of grading, the amount involved in a theft 
under sections 1732 to 1734 shall be the highest value by any reasonable stand-
ard, regardless of the actor's knowledge of such value, of the property or serv-
ices which were stolen by the actor, or which the actor believed that he was 
stealing, or which the actor could reasonably have anticipated to have been the 
property or services involved. Thefts committed pursuant to one scheme or 
course of conduct, whether from the same person or several persons may be 
charged as one offense and the amounts proved to have been stolen may be 
aggregated in determining the grade of the offense. 
The comment to section 1735 in the report points out that, under existing law, 
the value distinction in grading is $100, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 643-49 (1970): "In this 
[proposed] section, three values are mainly employed: $100,000 for the line between 
Class B and Class C felonies; $500 for the felony-misdemeanor line (reflecting the 
realities of inflation); and $50 for the Class B misdemeanor conditions set forth in 
subsection (4). . • • [I']he values of separate properties can be aggregated for grad-
ing purposes." FINAL REPORT, supra note 149', at 210. 
The continued reliance by the drafters of the two proposals upon the value of the 
property taken in order to determine the grade of the offense is questionable. An 
elderly couple who loses its life savings of $5,000 is arguably victimized more seri-
ously than the businessman defrauded of $100,000 in a stock swindle. This criterion 
cannot accurately reflect the impact of a serious fraud on the: individual consumer 
and the surrounding community. 
152. H.R. 333, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3201(1)(b) (1975). 
153. H.R. 333, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3-301(1)(a) (1975). 
154. H.R. 333, 9'4th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3201(1) (c) (1975). 
155. H.R. 333, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3301(1)(b) (1975). 
This bill also provides an alternative means for determining the fine to be im-
posed: 
§ 3301. Authorized fines ..... 
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Under the sentencing structure set forth in H.R. 333, the court's 
power to impose a mandatory minimum sentence would be more 
restricted than it is under existing law. The court could not impose a 
minimum term unless certain procedural requirements are satisfied, 
and "unless, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the 
offense and the history and character of the defendant, it is of the 
opinion that such a term is required because of the exceptional 
features of the case, such as warrant imposition of a term in the upper 
range under section 3202."156 Section 3202 allows "imposition of a 
term in the upper range" if the convicted felon is a "dangerous special 
offender"; among the various criteria for determining whether a 
convicted felon may be treated as a "dangerous special offender' is 
whether "he committed such felony as part of a pattern of criminal 
conduct which constituted a substantial source of his income, and in 
which he manifested special skill or expertise •... "1117 To comple-
ment the restrictions on minimum terms, the resolution permits parole 
"at any time" where there is no minimum sentence.1G8 
Although it generally treats all forms of theft similarly, H.R. 333 
does take· special notice of the problem of white-collar crime. It 
would enable the court to impose a special sanction on corporate 
executives and other business officials who are convicted of business-
related offenses: 
An e~ecutive officer or other manager of an organization con-
victed of an offense committed in furtherance of the affairs of the 
organization may, as part of the senrtence, be disqualified from exer-
cising similar functions in the same or other organizations for a 
period not exceeding five years, if the court finds the scope or will-
fuiness of his illegal actions make it dangerous for such functions to 
,be entrusted to him, 1G9 
(2) Alternative Measure.-In lieu of a fine imposed under subsection (1), 
a person who has been convicted of an offense through which he derived pecuni-
ary gain or by which he caused personal injury or property damage or loss may 
be sentenced to a fine which does not exceed twice the gain so derived or twice 
the loss caused to the victim. 
Furthermore, a defendant convicted of three or more class A misdemeanors within 
five years could be sentenced as though convicted of a class C felony "if the court 
is satisfied that there is an exceptional need for rehabilitative or incapacitative meas-
ures for the protection of the public." H.R. 333, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3003 (1) 
(1975), 
15(;. H.R. 333, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3201(3) (1975). The comment to section 
3201 in the report notes that, under existing law, 18 U.S.C. § 4208 (1970), all prison 
sentences include a minimum term that must be served before the prisoner can be-
come eligil>le for parole unless the court takes affirmative action. FINAL REPORT, 
supra note 149, at 286. 
157. H.R. 333, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3202(2)(b) (1975). 
158. H.R. 333, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3401(1) (1975). 
159. H.R. 333, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3502 (1975). The comment to this 
section in the report points out that this language goes beyond the current standard 
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Additionally, H.R. 333 would empower the courts to order an organi-
zation convicted of an offense to inform those who were victimized 
about that conviction "by mail or by advertising in designated areas 
or by designated media or otherwise."160 
An alternative proposal for a revised federal criminal code is 
H.R. 3907,161 introduced by Representative Wiggins. Unlike H.R. 
333, which incorporates false pretense and fraudulent conversion into 
theft,162 H.R. 3907 takes the approach of a general fraud statute.168 
A scheme or artifice to defraud or obtain property of another by false 
pretense is a class D felony that would be punishable by a prison term 
not to exceed seven years regardless of the value of the property 
involved.164 Section 230l(d) of this proposal would give a court 
for criminal liability for an agent's misdeeds, i.e., it is not limited to those offenses 
committed ''within the scope of his employment" Final Report, supra note 149, .at 
307. 
160. H.R. 33·3, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3007 (1975). The comment to this sec-
tion in the report states that the drafters intentionally omitted a provision for court-
ordered restitution because of congressional consideration that was being given to this 
remedy in independent proposals for consumer class-action legislation. FINAL RE-
PORT, supra note 149, at 276. 
161. H.R. 3907, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). This proposal grew out of S. 1400, 
93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), and is very similar to its predecessor. 
162. H.R. 333, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1731 (1975). 
163. See H.R. 3907, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1734 (1975), which provides: 
§ 1734. Executing a Fraudulent Sclleme 
(a) Offense.-A person is guilty of an offense if: 
( 1) having devised a scheme or artifice: 
(A) to defraud; or 
(B) to obtain property of another by means of a false or fraudulent 
pretense, representation, or promise; he engages in conduct with intent 
to execute such scheme or artifice; or 
(2) he transfers, or receives anything of value for, a right to participate 
in a pyramid sales scheme, or receives compensation from a pyramid 
sales scheme. 
164. H.R. 3907, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1734 (1975), quoted in note 163 supra. 
Section 2301(b)(4) of the proposed act provides for the seven-year maximum sen-
tence. Section 2301(c) further authorizes "extended terms of imprisonment for fel-
onies committed by dangerous special offenders" of up to 14 years for class D fel-
onies. 
Section 2302(b) sets forth the criteria for determining whether the defendant is 
a "dangerous special offender": 
§ 2302. Imposition of a Sentence of Imprisonment 
• "(i,j Criteria for Imposing an Extended Term of Imprisonment-The 
court, after the hearing required by Rule 32.1 of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, shall impose an extended term of imprisonment, within the range 
authorized by section 2301(c), if it finds that the defendant is a dangerous 
special o~ender, and that, considering the nature and circumstances of the of-
fense anq the history and characteristics of the defendant, such an extended 
term is warranted to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant. 
A defendant is a dangerous special offender if: 
(1) he has previously been convicted of two or more felonies committed 
on different occasions; one or more of such felonies resulted in his being 
in imprisonment prior to the commission of the current offense; one or 
more of such felonies was committed within, or resulted in his being in im-
prisonment or on probation or parole within ten years of the commission 
of the current offense·; and no such felony was charged to bo a basis for in-
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discretion to impose a twenty-one-month period of "parole ineligibil-
ity" on a person convicted of executing a fraudulent scheme. Like 
section 3201(3) of H.R. 333,165 this section would require the court 
to make certain affirmative findings. If a defendant convicted under 
section 1734 were found by the court to be a "dangerous special 
offender," the maximum term of parole ineligibility would be ten 
years.166 If no minimum term were set by the court, a convicted 
section 1734 offender could be released on parole after serving six 
months.167 
Section 2201 of this proposal would also authorize the imposition 
of criminal fines for a violation of section 1734-fines that are 
significantly heavier than those authorized by iH.R. 333-and would 
distinguish convicted individuals from convicted organizations.168 
Like Section 3301(2) of H.R. 333, H.R. 3907 establishes a "double 
damage provision," permitting as an alternative to other authorized 
creasing the grading of the current offense under section 1811 (Trafficking 
in an Opiate), 1812 (Trafficking in Drugs), 18l3 (Possession of Drugs), 
1'814 (Violating a Drug Regulation), or 1823 (Using a Weapon in the 
Course of a Crime); 
(2) he committed the current felony as part of a pattern of criminal 
conduct from which he derived a substantial portion of his income, or in 
which he manifested special skill or expertise-such as unusual knowledge, 
judgment, ability, or -manual dexterity-in facilitating the initiation, or-
ganizing, planning, financing, direction, management, supervision, execu, 
tion, or concealment of criminal conduct, the enlistment of accomplices in 
such conduct, the avoidance of detection or apprehension of such conduct, 
or the disposition of the fruits or proceeds of such conduct; or 
(3) the current felony constitutes, or was committed in furtherance of, 
a conspiracy with three or more other persons to engage in a pattern of 
criminal conduct; the current felony was not charged to be an offense, or 
an attempt or conspiracy to commit an offense, under section 1801 (Operat-
ing a Racketeering Syndicate) or 1'8Q2 (Racketeering) or 1803 (Washing 
Racketeering Proceeds); and he initiated, organized, planned, financed, di-
rected, managed, or supervised, all or part of such conspiracy or conduct, 
or agreed to do so, or gave or received a bribe or used force in the course 
of such conduct. 
For purposes of paragraphs (2) and (3), criminal conduct forms a pattern 
if it embraces criminal acts that have the same or sinillar purposes, results, 
accomplices, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are interre-
lated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events. 
165. See text at note 156 supra. 
166. H.R. 3907, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 230l(d) (1975). 
167. H.R. 3907, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 383l(a)(2) (1975). 
168. H.R. 3907, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2201 (1975) provides: 
§ 2201. Sentence of Fine .... 
(b) Authorized Fines.-Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c) or 
any other provision of law, the authorized fines are: 
(1) if the defendant is an individual: 
(A) for a felony, not more than $100,000; 
(B) for a misdemeanor, not more than $10,000; 
(C) for an infraction, not more than $1,000; 
(2) if the defendant is an organization: 
(A) for a felony, not more than $500,000; 
(B) for a misdemeanor, not more than $100,000; 
(C) for an infraction, not more than $10,000. 
For fines imposed under H.R. 333, see text at notes 153 and 155 supra, 
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fines "a fine that does not exceed twice the gross gain derived or twice 
the gross loss caused, whichever is the greater.ma9 
The two resolutions differ somewhat in their provision of sanc-
tions of a "civil" nature. Like H.R. 333, H.R. 3907 contains a 
provision authorizing the court to order an individual convicted of a 
fraud offense to give notice of that conviction ta his victims.170 
Section 4021 of H.R. 3907 authorizes the Attorney General to bring 
an action in federal district court to enjoin any person from engaging 
in any act that could constitute a qaudulent scheme under section 
1734, but this proposal has no provision for special injunctive sanc-
tions for convicted corporate managers comparable to that found in 
H.R. 333. H.R. 3907 would, however, break some new ground by 
making pyramid sales schemes a class D felony, punishable by a 
maximum of seven years imprisonment.171 H.R. 333 contains no such 
provision. 
Both H.R. 333 and H.R. 3907 would simplify the prosecutor's 
task of choosing the appropriate statute to use against a seemingly 
endless variety of fraud offenses. Nevertheless, both of these propos-
als fall short from the standpoint of deterrence. Under both propos-
als, most criminal consumer-fraud offenses carry potential seven-year 
prison sentences, an increase of two years over the available sanctions 
for fraud under existing federal statutes. But this term fails to reflect 
the gravity of schemes that inflict such heavy damage upon society.172 
Furthermore, taken in conjunction with the liberal parole provisions 
and the limited authority to impose minimum terms found in both 
versions, the proposed seven-year sanction fails to create a more 
credible threat of significant punishment for fraudulent conduct than 
does existing law. In short, both H.R. 333 and H.R. 3907 offer too 
little to cope with a problem on which society can no longer afford to 
compromise. The drafters of these two proposals would deny the 
judiciary, as well as law enforcement agencies, the ability to employ 
the threat of a heavy prison sentence in those cases that merit it. 
Judicial flexibility demands more. By increasing the maximum pen-
169. H.R. 3907, 94thCong., lstSess. § 2201(e) (1975). 
170. Compare H.R. 3907, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2004 (1975), with H.R. 3-33, 
94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3007 (1975). Section 2004 is somewhat broader in its cov-
erage than section 3007 in that it would apply to individuals convicted of fraud of-
fenses and organizations convicted of any offense. 
171. H.R. 3907, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1734 (1975). 
172. Although H.R. 3907 has a provision for special offenders that carries a po-
tential sentence of greater than seven years, see note 164 supra, the current reluctance 
of the judiciary to impose stiff penal sanctions on so-called white-collar criminals 
causes doubt that this discretionary provision will be frequently used. If the judiciary 
becomes more sensitive to the victimization caused by criminal consumer frauds, per-
haps this provision will have some deterrence value. 
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alties for these theft offenses to ten years, the law would, at the very 
least, create more of an in terrorem effect upon potential offenders 
than that provided by existing statutes. At the same time, the 
judiciary would remain free to stay the heavy hand of such a statute in 
appropriate cases. So long as the conduct made criminal by the 
statute is clearly and narrowly defined, there is little chance that such 
judicial latitude will be abused. 
In addition to the two proposed versions of a revised federal 
criminal code, Congress now has before it a proposed consumer-fraud 
act173 designed to prohibit unfair and deceptive practices in commerce. 
As one justice department spokesman has described it, the proposed 
consumer-fraud act is aimed not at the businessman who makes an 
honest mistake, but "squarely at the fast-buck artists, the sucker 
schemes, the quick rip-off operators who do not have customers, only 
victims."174 The bill would impose a fine of not more than $10,000 
or imprisonment for not more than three years, or both, on persons 
who commit one or more of the enumerated unfair consumer prac-
tices. The list of unfair consumer practices in the proposed act is an 
extensive one. It would criminalize a broad range of business con-
duct that falls over the line distinguishing shrewd practice from fraud. 
For example, the bill would put the business community clearly on 
notice that the federal government would no longer tolerate "bait and 
switch" schemes, deceptive advertising concerning the quality, safety, 
or actual cost of goods or services, fraudulent schemes in which 
performance of services or delivery of goods is never intended, mis-
leading prize offerings, pyramid sales schemes, techniques of harass-
ment, and any other practices that are unfair to consumers.176 
The proposed consumer-fraud act, in attempting to plug the 
jurisdictional loopholes left by existing federal fraud statutes, 176 rep-
resents a step in the right direction. But, for two reasons, it is 
nevertheless an insufficient response to the criminal consumer-fraud 
problem. First, the bill is not simply a proposal for a general fraud 
173. S. 670, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). 
114. Hearings on S.642 and S.670 Before the Subcomm. for Consumers of the 
Senate Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 87 (1975) (statement of K. 
Clearwaters, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division) [hereinafter 
1975 Senate Hearings]. 
175. The act would criminalize unfair and deceptive trade practices falling within 
section 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) 
(1970). The Justice Department believes that this provision would create only con-
fusion between the courts and the FfC, which is charged with interpreting and en-
forcing that section. See 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 174, at 84. 
116. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1970). For an explanation of the jurisdictional 
limits of the federal mail-fraud statute, see United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395 
(1974). 
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statute. It seeks to serve as a broad consumer-fraud and unfair-trade-
practices statute, arguably applying to some conduct not heretofore 
made criminal. From the merchant's standpoint, the proposed act is 
too indefinite in its description of the conduct proscribed. For the 
same reason, it is unlikely that in its present form it will be welcomed 
by conscientious federal prosecutors or accepted by the legislators. It 
has, in fact, been criticized by spokesmen for the Justice Department 
and the United States Attorney's Office for the Distict of Columbia 
for going too far beyond the scope of consumer protection, and for 
being potentially unconstitutionally vague.177 If both potential abuse 
of the statute by overzealous prosecutors and constitutional challenge 
are to be avoided, more specific delineation of the unlawful conduct is 
required. 
Second, the three-year penal sanction offered by the proposed act 
is inadequate to meet the requirements of justice and deterrence. 
Incredibly, it is the position of the Justice Department that a first 
offense under this proposed act should be only a misdemeanor (pun-
ishable by imprisonment for a maxim.um of one year and a $1,000 
fine) and that the felony sanction should be retained only for second 
offenses. The Department reasons that this provision would impart 
to the bill greater credibility for local judges, juries, and the commu-
nity as a whole.178 This position appears to underestimate the pub-
lic's unwillingness to tolerate deceit in the marketplace any longer. To 
allay the business community's fear of an unwarranted attack on 
those committing honest mistakes and marginal! indiscretions, the 
most appropriate response would be not to water down the potential 
penalties, but rather to tighten up the language of the bill in order to 
delineate clearly the conduct that is proscri.bed. Otherwise, the pro-
posed consumer-fraud act would be just another toothless law, inade-
quate to deal with the problems for which it was designed. 
IV. CoNCLUSION 
A decision to rely more heavily on the, penal sanction to regulate 
marketplace conduct involves costs that must be carefully weighed 
against the gains to be achieved and the utility of alternative methods 
of social control. There is undoubtedly room for consumer-protec-
tion innovations not relying on the penal sanction. Many such 
innovations presently being considered are intended either to restrain 
offenders from continuing specific deceptive practices or to publicize 
177. Ogren Interview, supra note 1. 
178. 197S Senate Hearings, supra note 174, at 83. 
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findings of fraudulent conduct. 179 The injunctive remedy would en-
able the authorities to put the fraudulent operator temporarily out of 
commission. It is, however, a stopgap measure that offers little long-
term relief to the community and places the burden of action upon 
the consumer and enforcement authorities.180 Required public apol-
ogies, publication of violations, and media exposes help to improve 
the consumers' bargaining position by educating them to recognize 
specific schemes. Consumer H-E-L-P, for example, has cooperated 
with the television and radio media in producing prime-time shows 
dealing with frauds involving record clubs, land investments, employ-
ment services, dating and singles clubs, and auto, electronics, and 
home repairs.181 These programs have the dual advantage of inform-
ing consumers quickly and soliciting support for needed local law 
enforcement and reform. This sort of remedy, however, is responsive 
only to the comparatively few criminal consumer-fraud violations that 
are either rampant or painstakingly uncovered; it does little to deter 
innovation by fly-by-night operators. For these reasons, these reme-
dies should be considered supplements to and not substitutes for 
conscientious law enforcement.182 
If law enforcement is to play more than a symbolic role in curbing 
criminal consumer fraud, several changes must be made in our law 
enforcement priorities and procedures. First, they should recognize 
the impact of fraud on the consuming community and how it occurs. 
Second, investigatory resources should be allocated with regard to 
patterns of victimization that extend beyond the bilateral dispute. A 
systematic record of complaints should also be maintained. Third, 
179. See Geis & Edelhertz, supra note 26, at 1003. 
180. Stiff criminal sanctions for consumer fraud offenses would shift some of the 
burden of action back on to merchants by notifying them of the high costs of pursu-
ing deceptive practices. A remedy that allows the law to intervene only after fraud 
has occurred places the public in a defensive posture and forces the public, rather 
than the business community, to absorb the costs of law enforcement. 
181. The Consumer H-E-L-P Center has worked closely with WITG-TV Metro-
media and WRC/TV-NBC in producing consumer-abuse news stories for broadcast 
in prime-time. The impact of these one-to-six-minute documentaries is substantial. 
First, they provide another way in which the media can expose consumer abuses and 
offer protection to a large segment of the population. Second, the mere threat of 
mass exposure is often sufficient to correct fraudulent practices. Finally, the docu-
mentary serves as a consumer education device that helps steer people away from spe-
cious operators and toward legitimate businesses. The effectiveness of the H-E-L-P 
program is greatly enhanced by television's broad reach. Law students at the 
H-E-L-P Center take complaints and provide consumer expertise; the stations provide 
the publicity. This combination of legal expertise and television exposure has con-
tn"buted to establishing responsibility in Washington metropolitan area marketplaces. 
See TV Guide, Sept. 20-26, 1975, at 7. 
182. For a .recent discussion of the merits of employing state registration and li-
censing of businesses that have generated a high frequency of consumer dissatisfac-
tion, see Ogren, supra note 7, at 977-78 n.54. 
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law enforcement authorities and local consumer groups should coop-
erate in sorting out potential criminal offenses from the civil disputes 
reported. Finally, a general consumer-fraud statute should be enacted 
that carries penal sanctions reflecting the extent of victimization in 
a given case. These innovations woula not require a massive infusion 
of additional resources;. on the contrary, they could be instituted by 
planned resource reallocation. 
In the final analysis, the problems posed by criminal consumer 
fraud are not ones that can be successfully attacked by any single type 
of remedy alone. Required is "that mix of criminal, civil, administra-
tive and private remedies which will provide the greatest deterrence of 
economic offenders, the maximum protection and benefits to victims, 
and the best satisfaction of the public need to perceive th.at justice is 
being done."188 Each of the various approaches is peculiarly adapted 
to cope with particular facets of the offense and the victimization that 
results from it; each can fulfill its function if appropriately applied. 
Prosecutors appear to be ready and able to use their available re-
sources to attack the most serious criminal consumer-fraud offenses. 
New and innovative methods of accomplishing the enforcement task 
are available. Desperately needed, however, is a ;reorientation of our 
criminal enforcement priorities to permit the utilization of these 
means. 
The criminal consumer-fraud problem requires of the nation's 
lawmakers and judiciary greater sensitivity to both the long-term 
interests of society and the short-term interests of the victimized 
consumer. Their present insensitivity has forced prosecutors to 
choose between remedies that benefit the public at the expense of the 
victim and those that accomplish the reverse. If legislators recognize 
that victimization will be prevented in the long run only when future 
deceptive conduct is effectively deterred, they will arrive at the ines-
capable conclusion that it is necessary to enact stronger penal sanc-
tions for criminal consumer fraud. 
183. Geis & Edelhertz, supra note 26, at 1010. 

